Partisanship and Politics in the U.S. Civil Service by Limbocker, Scott Andrew
  
Partisanship and Politics in the U.S. Civil Service 
 
By 
Scott Limbocker 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
Political Science 
June 30, 2018 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
 
Approved: 
Joshua D. Clinton, Ph.D. 
David E. Lewis, Ph.D. 
Alan E. Wiseman, Ph.D. 
Hye Young You, Ph.D. 
Jason Grissom, Ph.D. 
  
ii 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Corinna and Mo 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
iii 
 
I will undoubtedly forget someone I need to thank in this section. To begin though, it is 
easiest to begin with the people who have approved this dissertation. Dave Lewis has reliably 
guided me through my time at Vanderbilt, both as a student and professionalizing me into the 
disciple. He began our relationship by converting a research assignment to a co-authorship that 
spurred the research agenda I am currently undertaking. Josh Clinton provided many useful 
conversations about my research and about research methods more generally that has in some 
way shaped every project I have worked on while at Vanderbilt. His voice will always be in the 
back of my head about asking the big question and explaining it so my parents and grandparents 
could understand. Finally, Alan Wiseman provided excellent feedback and shaping the 
arguments in the dissertation. He also served as an excellent role model in the classroom that I 
am sure played a part in my successful search for employment this past year.   
My two outside members also are in need of thanking.  Hye Young You always was 
available for a conversation about my work. The tricks in Stata for data management eased my 
work load in this project and several others.  Much of my work would have taken much longer 
without these pointers. Jason Grissom’s expertise with turnover proved valuable in investigating 
public sector turnover. I appreciated his thoughts and comments regarding these projects. 
Chapters 2 and 3 would not have been possible without the hard work put in by Mark 
Richardson and Dave Lewis on the 2014 Survey for the Future of Government Service.  I am 
grateful to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Vanderbilt University, the 
Volcker Alliance, the Princeton Survey Research Center, and Charles Cameron. Thank you also 
to the civil servants that answered the survey. Many of the same people deserve thanking for an 
earlier version of the Survey for the Future of Government Service fielded in 2007-2008 which  
 
 
 
 
iv 
was also utilized in this dissertation. 
 I have been fortunate to call the Department of Political Science home for the past six years. 
Marc Hetherington’s afternoon chats in CSDI always brightened the afternoon. Moreover, 
coaching his son Sammy in baseball provided an oasis at times from the stresses of graduate 
school. Bruce Oppenheimer also provided nice breaks in the action to talk baseball while it got 
one of his CSDI chocolate fixes. 
 Many fellow graduate students aided me during my six years a Vanderbilt. Aside from 
professional help, they also delivered great friendships. Oscar Castorena and Laura Sellers were 
superb cohort-mates in our mighty class of three. Evan Haglund and Jen Selin were excellent 
role models in how to be CSDI affiliates. I also enjoyed my time in CSDI with other graduate 
students, Sheahan Virgin, Michael Shepherd, James Martheus and Darrian Stacy and Carrie 
Roush. I’ll always remember the lively conversations that took place in CSDI. Also thank you to 
the group text members (Drew Engelhardt, Bryan Rooney, Marc Trussler and Steve Utych) for 
the consistent laugh those texts always provided.  
My family loved and supported me throughout this process. Corinna moved to Nashville so 
I could go through this program (and agreed to become family nearly five years ago). My 
parents, Craig and Kathi, always were there to chat, especially during the lovely 30 plus minute 
commutes Nashville traffic offers. My brother, Ryan, and sister, Sarah, were reliably a phone 
call away for a chat when needed. Same is true for my in-laws, Chuck and Debbie Rees. And, 
finally, Mo pup provided the necessary injection of life over the last two years to bring this 
project to a close. 
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
v 
Page 
DEDICATION .......................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................iii 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. x 
Chapter……………………………………………………………………………………... 
1 Theoretical Frame ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Oversimplification of Administration ...................................................................... 1 
1.2 Path Forward ............................................................................................................. 6 
 
2 Why do Bureaucrats Contribute to Presidential Candidates ......................................... 11 
2.1 Federal Employees as Political Actors ................................................................... 13 
2.2 Federal Employees as Non-Political Actors ........................................................... 17 
2.3 Motivations for Giving ........................................................................................... 17 
2.4 Data ......................................................................................................................... 20 
2.5 Expressive Giving ................................................................................................... 22 
2.6 Strategic Giving ...................................................................................................... 22 
2.7 Agency Characteristics ........................................................................................... 24 
2.8 Results for 2012 ...................................................................................................... 26 
2.9 Results for 2008 and 2004 ...................................................................................... 30 
2.10 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 37 
2.11 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 40 
 
3 Partisan Turnover in the Permanent Civil Service ........................................................ 43 
3.1 Why Do Senior Civil Servants Exit Government ................................................... 46 
3.2 Politics, Partisanship, and Turnover  ...................................................................... 47 
3.3 Data ......................................................................................................................... 50 
3.4 Who Exits? Adjudicating between Competing Predictions ................................... 52 
3.5 Testing Traditional Explanations of Exit ................................................................ 53 
3.6 Methods .................................................................................................................. 55 
3.7 Results .................................................................................................................... 56 
3.8 Changing Partisan Distribution in the Management Corps .................................... 59 
3.9 Early Discussion of the Trump Administration ...................................................... 62 
3.10 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 63 
 
4 Politics and Tenure of U.S. Political Appointees, 1977-2014 ....................................... 65 
 
 
 
vi 
4.1 Bureaucratic Control and Turnover ........................................................................ 66 
4.2 Variety of Appointees ............................................................................................. 69 
4.3 Data ......................................................................................................................... 71 
4.4 Hypotheses .............................................................................................................. 75 
4.5 Controls .................................................................................................................. 76 
4.6 Results .................................................................................................................... 77 
4.7 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 82 
4.8 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 85 
 
5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 87 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 91 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 106 
A. Counts of Candidates Reviving Contributions by Bureaucrats ............................. 106 
B.  Cross Party Giving……………………………………………………………… 109 
C. Multilevel Modeling Robustness Check …………………………………………… 110 
D. OPM Computational Alternative Specifications ……………………………….. 114 
E. Conditional Values Models …………………………………………………….. 118 
F. Agency Average Models ……………………………………………………….. 120 
G. Ideology vs PID Check…. ………………………………………………………121 
H. What Predicts Changing Opinions?…………………………………………….. 125 
I.  Chapter 2 Alternative Specifications …………………………………………… 127 
J. Models Estimating Conditional Relationship…….……………………………....128 
K. Discussion of Controls………………………………………………………….. 134 
L. Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………….136 
M. Summary of Chapter 3 Control Variables……………………………………… 137 
N. Comparison to Career Civil Servants……………………………………………138 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
viii  
Table                                                                                                                                Page 
2.1 Probit Estimations of Bureaucrats Giving to Presidential Candidates………… 28 
2.2 Probit Estimations of Contribution to a Presidential Candidate, 2004-2008….. 31 
2.3 Probit Estimations of Careerist Giving to Presidential Candidates, 2004-2012. 35 
3.1 Careerist Turnover Intention Compared to Actual Turnover………………….. 52 
3.2 Estimates of Exit for Careerists, 2008-2015…………………………………... 57 
4.1 Length of Tenure Description for Political Appointees……………………….. 72 
4.2 Probit Estimates for Government Exit for Federal Appointees, 1977-2014…... 80 
A.1 Count of Donors in the SFGS Sampleby Candidate, 2004-2012…..…………106 
 
A.2: Contributions Made by Survey Respondents by Candidate, 2012-2004..…...108 
 
B.1: Cross Party Giving by Federal Employees to Presidential Candidates….…..109 
 
  C.1: Multilevel Probit Models of Table 2.1 ……………………………..……...110 
 
C.2: Multilevel Probit Models of Table 2.2 ……………………………..……...112  
 
D.1: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 201....115 
 
D.2: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 2008..116 
 
D.3: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 200....117 
 
E.1: Conditional Relationship of Values……………………………….….……...119 
 
F.1: Agency Average Models…………………………………………….....…….120 
 
G.1: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2012………….....…………122 
 
G.2: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2008………….….…...……123 
 
G.3: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2004……………..…...……124 
 
H.1: Probit Estimations of Staying in Government by Response Category to the 
                   Likelihood of Leaving Question………………………………..…...…….….126 
 
 
 
 
ix  
I.1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Turnover of Careerists in the Obama  
       Administration………………………………………………….….………....127 
 
J.1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Turnover of Careerists in the 
      Obama Administration with Interaction Terms for Agency Ideology  
      and Individual Partisanship………………………………………………..…..130 
 
J.2: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of Exit Exploring Retirement Age as a 
                  Conditional Relationship with Partisanship………………………......……….131 
 
J.3: Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Exit Using only Obama Administration 
      Years, 2009 – 2015………………………………………………………..…..132 
 
L.1: Descriptive Statistics of Individuals Leaving of Pay Plan but Remaining in the 
       Federal Government……………...…………………………...………...…….135 
 
M.1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables………………………….....……...136 
 
N.1: Length of Tenure Description, 1977-2014……………………….…........…..138 
 
N.2: Estimates for Government Exit for Federal Employees, 1977-201…..……...139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
x  
Figure                                                                                                                     Page 
2.1 Careerist Giving by Party Identification……………………………………….. 33 
3.1 Change in Partisan Share of Civil Service, Due to Exit over a  
      Two-Term Admin……………………………………………………………… 61 
 
4.1 Number of Appointee Exits by Year…………………………………………....73 
 
4.2 Percent of Appointees Departing by Year………………………………...…....74 
 
4.3 Change in the Probability of Exit for One Congressional Session……..………82 
 
N.1 Change in the Probability of Exit for one Congressional Session…………....140 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
1  
Theoretical Frame 
 Political scientists far too often appeal to their own intellectual vanity by suggesting they 
have provided a new theory about how the world works. This dissertation does not make any 
such bold claim. Rather, through endeavoring to directly observe the action in question rather 
than rely on proxies, I test several well housed beliefs regarding the executive branch of the 
United States. Through three related but substantively different chapters, I show how civil 
servants engage in the political process and how politics shapes their careers.  
 
1.1 The Oversimplification of Administration 
Modern governance is complicated. Every day civil servants make decisions about the 
safety of medicine, ensure airplanes safely arrive at their destination, regulate nuclear energy, 
and distribute billions of dollars to citizens that need that assistance to survive. In all of these 
daily activities, policy experts tasked with carrying out rules and laws in a fair in just manner 
apply their expertise to maximize welfare for citizens of the United States. As such, governments 
have sought to attract the best and brightest in order to ensure the best possible outcomes for its 
citizens. 
This rosy presentation of the role of civil servants juxtaposes itself against the need for 
democratic accountability. While these policy experts provide reasoned judgements, it is also 
true that their decisions are only held responsible to the public to the degree that elected officials 
desire. The civil servants only have authority to act if delegated by elected politicians. The 
retention of that authority is contingent upon elected officials approving of their actions by not 
revoking the civil servants decisions. Politics must be present to ensure democratic outcomes 
from administration, but politics in administration has the potential to compromise decisions 
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reached by experts. When faced with this conundrum, what should scholars of the executive 
branch do in analyzing the modern administrative state? 
Unfortunately, the common solution is to assume away politics. Since Woodrow Wilson, 
one of the operating paradigms of administration is the political-administration dichotomy. He 
wrote “Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for 
administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices” (Wilson 1887). That 
arrangement supposes that the individual civil servant sets aside her beliefs about politics and 
carries out the orders of the political overseer.  And while this is probably true during the time 
Wilson was writing, because the administrative decisions largely focused on setting fair rates for 
rail travel, it likely falls short today, when administrators face decisions like how to best resolve 
issues of poverty or construct an education system that maximizes outcomes for students. The 
latter set of policy questions requires at a minimum a flavor of politics, if not a wholly political 
answer. 
Yet the initial frame posited by Wilson has not been updated to account for the political 
realities in modern governance. Formal models of bureaucratic policy making typically assume 
the agency to have an ideal point that is exogenously determined, meaning that the agency does 
not determine the initial policy position it takes. When they do have some control deciding 
policy, it is given to the agency by the appointee, who represents the present’s ideal policy. Or, 
agencies can shift agency policy set by the political actors slightly. Neither seems particularly 
satisfying when the people that are experts in the area and tasked to carry out implementation 
and enforcement have almost no say in how policy is set or determined. 
Even behavioral analyses look to assume away the political realities modern agencies 
face. To be sure, agencies certainly gain creditability by maintaining professional norms and 
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ensuring professional outcomes. But creditability and professionalism are hardly well defined 
and empirically observable concepts. By and large, each relies on face validity and the Potter 
Stewart standard of “knowing it when you see it” to frame arguments. Little credit is given to the 
ability of civil servants to navigate the political woods in Washington, D.C. Even less credit is 
given to them participating and playing politics. Yet, we have every reason to think it is an 
option for agencies to take. Presidents worry about appointees becoming a part of the agency 
rather than a vehicle for their policy. The winning over of appointees from their boss to the side 
of the agency seems like it has some sort of political flavor. Bureau chiefs take steps to ensure 
unwanted tasks do not fall on their desks. Anticipating that action seems from someone who has 
set aside their political beliefs about policy seems to stretch credulity. 
The bureaucratic ideal of neutral competence suggests federal employees set aside 
personal political beliefs in carrying out their job functions. Yet, but virtue of working in the 
public sector, federal employees potentially interact and receive instructions of how to carry out 
their job from political actors. In cases of disagreement between the wishes of political principals 
and the preferences of the agency, federal employees simply following instructions, presuming 
the request has legal authority, from political actors anecdotally does not hold. Richard Nixon 
informed appointees that they would face “disloyalty and obstruction” from those with civil 
service status (Aberbach and Rockmand 1976). Additionally, Ronald Reagan sought to end 
retrenchment and the scope of involvement for federal agencies in the lives of citizens (Nathan 
1983). In his 1996 State of the Union address Bill Clinton declared the era of “big government” 
to be over. For civil servants tasked with carrying out a task, the president saying the agency 
should stop doing something takes a conflictual tone. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
publically fought president Obama regarding executive action on immigration (Bono 2014). 
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Agencies have the potential to house a resistant culture towards political actors that might 
spill over into the political arena. Acutely, a recent news article published by The Hill noted 
substantial differences between who was receiving campaign contributions from federal 
employees, with the lion’s share of money going to Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump (Swan 
2016). At an extreme, the Consumer Financial Protection Board only contributed money to 
Hillary Clinton (Fox News 2016). Employees in these agencies that participate politically stand 
to face an interesting crossroad when orders from President Trump come across their desk and it 
is plausible that these employees resist this orders. 
Federal employees, despite normative desires for neutral behavior, can have political 
preferences of their own and have the opportunity to engage political action in carrying out their 
job tasks. Aberbach and Rockamn (1976) noted Richard Nixon faced and administrative state 
populated by members of his opposing party. In the later work, they also demonstrate that three 
different Republican administrations sought to rebalance the partisan distribution of federal 
employees in favor of more loyal civil servants (Aberbach and Rockman 2000). This sort of 
influence, as framed by Moe (1985), is the natural byproduct of presidents seeking to place loyal 
individuals in the federal government in order to see the president’s agenda enacted. 
The previous characterization of federal employees as political actors focuses on the 
desires of the president. But, there is another side to this narrative. The reason why presidents 
must trade competence and loyalty is that federal employees have preferences of their own that 
they act upon in ways that could run counter to what the president desires. Golden (2001) notes 
that federal employees that disagree with policy have the option either exit government, voice 
their discontent, demonstrate loyalty through responsiveness, or neglect their own personal 
feelings and comply with the new administration. Given limited options, federal employees 
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could also turn to the ballot box to voice their desire for political change. If they are, those 
federal employees engaging in political activities do so in ways that could systematically 
correlate with their job function. 
 Past work also indicates the possibility professional norms and agency reputations 
motivate federal employees to act in an apolitical fashion. Kaufman (1981) and Wilson (1989) 
frequently note administrative behavior motivated by the desire to maintain an agency’s 
reputation. Carpenter (2010) posits agency reputations being staked to how well an agency does 
its job, the honesty of the agency, the capacity of the agency to carry out its mission, and the 
procedural compliance with rulings regarding the agency. While these concepts might not be 
related to one another, explicitly absent but implicitly present in this construction is the role of 
the agency being subservient to political actors. Carpenter and Krause (2012) suggest agencies 
rely heavily on reputation to avoid political alienation and maintain support. In their assessment, 
administrators rely heavily on the reputation of the agency to navigate these potentially choppy 
political waters. One benefit of an enhanced reputation for agencies is increased authority and 
autonomy (Carpenter 2001; Wilson 1989). In sum, these accounts suggest that professional 
norms carry the day and federal employees rise out the political morass to execute law in an 
objective and apolitical fashion because that is what provides the greatest long run benefit for the 
agency. 
The two previous characterizations of the behaviors of federal employees perhaps suggest 
a theoretical conflict regarding agency behavior. This is not necessarily the case as each 
characterization is not mutually exclusive. Civil servants do not operate with total political 
naiveté; they also maintain high levels of professional decorum. What this dissertation aims to 
argue is that the scholarly literature pays far too little attention to how political federal 
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employees are and how that political behaviors translate in to their jobs. To provide evidence for 
this line of argument, I will show how political servants participate in elections and how they do 
so strategically. Next, I will show politics shaping how long top civil servants remain in 
government. Finally, I will demonstrate that the tenure of political appointees is shaped by 
institutional arrangements. These changes in tenure are indicative of political control of the 
agency and the autonomy with which the agency has to operate. The following section more 
concretely describes the studies used to substantiate these claims. 
1.2 Path Forward 
The next chapters progress with two overarching goals. The first is substantive: 
demonstrating that federal employees engage in politics as private citizens and that politics 
enters their work lives. Before demonstrating how politics enters the workplace for federal 
employees, it is necessary to demonstrate a heterogeneity of participation in elections.  To do so, 
this project will examine how federal employees spend their money in elections by contributing 
money to candidates seeking the presidency. 
The contributions of federal employees sit in a unique context compared to other citizens. 
Governed by the Hatch Act, civil servants can contribute to elections, just not in any 
governmental capacity. The bulk of the restrictions in elections deal with solicitation of 
contributions, not the individual actions of any civil servant. In addition to the context in which 
they contribute, the destination of the contribution, when it is to a presidential candidate, goes to 
someone who either will be the future boss of the civil servant or ran against their boss. This 
means the signal sent to the president from the civil servant can either be one of cooperation with 
the new administration, or if things do not work out for the candidate receiving the contribution, 
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a signal that could out the civil servant as being of the opposition party. Moreover, aside from 
the civil servant being an individual signal to the administration, civil servants could act together 
to signal the disposition of the agency or attempt to influence their future boss. The extent to 
which any of these behaviors is occurring is an open empirical question that this project tackles 
in the next chapter. To do so, original surveys of top federal employees will be matched with the 
contributions each respondent made to presidential candidates. This will allow for the 
understanding of political beliefs of individuals as it relates to the decision to give or not to give 
to presidential candidates. 
After showing a variety of strategic behaviors with the patterns of campaign contributions 
of federal employees, the next chapter examines if politics shapes the careers of federal 
employees. Namely, do the career decisions of when civil servants opt to leave government 
correlate with political factors surrounding the agency. Recent work (Bolton et al. 2016) found 
that out-partisans are more likely to exit following a change in presidential administration. This 
useful demonstration is not surprising, given the beliefs of executive conflict with agencies who 
have a mission misaligned with the president. Yet even this demonstration only shows that 
agencies that have beliefs different than the president have an increase in turnover. It only 
implies out-partisans are leaving. Chapter 3 connects the work histories of career civil servants 
during the Bush administration and then tracks those individuals during the Obama 
administration to see which federal employees leave both during the transition, but also during 
the course of the majority of the Obama administration. Conducting such a study will allow for a 
richer understanding of who is leaving government. 
The final empirical chapter, Chapter 4, examines the departure of political appointees to 
understand better the nature of bureaucratic control. As mentioned previously, elected officials 
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conducting oversight is what prevents democratic norms from being violated when rules 
generated by civil servants govern behaviors of citizens. Yet who has control over the 
bureaucracy is a far from settled question. And even if it were settled, who holds political power 
changes, and the nature of oversight changes in turn. As the political actors lose control over 
agencies during certain political arrangements, the agency stands to gain in autonomy. 
One consistent finding across many disciplines is that individuals leave their place of 
work when they lose control over the decisions being made at that job. As such, agency 
autonomy will ebb and flow with tenures of civil servants. Extended tenures imply greater 
autonomy while increased turnover suggests less autonomy for the federal employee. Chapter 4 
specifically tracks the tenure of all appointees on the Executive Schedule, all Schedule C 
employees and all noncareer members of the Senior Executive Service from 1976 to 2014 to 
consider how divided government and congressional oversight committees shape the tenure of 
federal employees. The results of this analysis find that when the political party opposite the 
president controls the Senate, appointees stay longer, suggesting the agency has greater control 
over decision-making. This contribution helps better understand who has control over the 
bureaucracy when conducting oversight. 
The second overarching goal is methodological: provide better insights to important 
substantive questions by better measuring the concepts in the question. Technological and data 
limitations of the past has left scholars to turn to proxies and samples to better understand the 
substantive question. Yet in doing so certain assumptions must hold for the results to be 
generalizable beyond the sample. I take advantage of better technology and data to test the 
assumptions in prior work with each empirical chapter. 
Chapter 2 helps the scholarly understanding of the motivations of campaign 
9 
contributions. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) provides very granular and detailed 
information about every contribution and dollar spent in federal elections. One can know the 
name, zip code and employment of the person who made the contribution. This allows for the 
answering of seemingly any question related to campaign contributions. However, this is not the 
case for one question: why? FEC records are only those that gave. A peer group of those that did 
not is not included, leaving scholars to assume plenty about the distribution of those who gave. 
To get a sample with those that did not give, scholars will included a question on a nationally 
representative sample of if someone gave money to an election. But this, too, has pitfalls. Where 
the money went is unclear. Moreover, covariates explaining why the person might have 
contributed money are at best coarse. 
Chapter 2 resolves many of these difficulties. By merging a survey of federal employees 
with FEC data, I uncover exactly who gave money to federal elections with a peer group that did 
not. As such, I know why someone in a similar strata opted not to give money, where those that 
did contribute directly gave their money to, and have a sample of people who sit in work 
environment with clear gains to be made for making the contribution. This allows for a better 
understanding of why someone contributed money simply by virtue of a better data construction. 
Scholars of turnover face a different data problem that stands to compromise results. 
Public records will allow for the observance of when someone leaves government. Those records 
will in no way account for the political beliefs of those individuals and the work environment. To 
get those important beliefs, scholars turn to surveys. Yet, by virtue of being in the survey, the 
individual currently works in government. Rather than wait several years to see who leaves, 
scholars include a question about how likely to survey respondent is to leave their place of work 
in the future. Saying one is going to quit is quite different, in terms of costs to the employee, than 
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actually leaving the job. I merge a survey of federal employees with their employment histories 
to resolve this problem. To preview a methodological find in Chapter 3, these differences vary 
systematically, with partisans over reporting their exit intention. 
Finally, Chapter 4 considers control of the bureaucracy over several decades across all 
agencies. Past work has either looked in a cross section for control, used a theoretical model, or 
taken one agency and done a case study on that agency. While each contributes to the scholarly 
understanding of bureaucratic control, each approach has questions about generalizability. Cross 
sectional studies might be the reflection of what was occurring in that particular year. Theoretical 
models might abstract away important factors. Case studies might select an agency that is not 
representative of others in government. By turning to the employment history of all appointees, 
Chapter 4 is able to consider an extended period of time and all employees with real employment 
outcomes to see who controls the bureaucracy. 
With the theoretical stage set, and the substantive and methodological payoffs 
highlighted, it is now time to turn to describing each of the studies referenced above. 
Chapter 2 
11 
Why Do Bureaucrats Make Campaign Contributions to Presidential 
Candidates?: Evidence from 2004-2012 
Like other citizens, federal employees commit time and money to presidential candidates 
seeking federal office.1 However, unlike other citizens, federal employees work in an executive 
establishment governed by a person to whom they may donate. As Moe (2006) notes, “even the 
most ordinary bureaucrats, by taking collective action in elections and other realms of politics, 
may be able to exercise political power in determining who their bosses are and what choices the 
latter will make in office” (p. 2). The exercising of political control could operate directly 
through the selection mechanism for the office or more indirectly by signaling to political 
principals the collective preferences of the agency or individual preferences of the contributor. 
The extent to which bureaucrats engage in presidential elections is open for empirical 
investigation. 
One form of political participation bureaucrats could coordinate with one another to 
influence the president is through campaign contributions. A recent news article published by 
The Hill noted substantial differences between which presidential candidates received money 
from federal employees in the 2016 election, with the vast majority of money going to Hillary 
Clinton over Donald Trump. The State Department, where Clinton recently had served as 
Secretary, gave over $400,000 to Secretary Clinton compared to just over $4,000 to Mr. Trump. 
Department of Justice employees contributed nearly $300,000 to presidential candidates, of 
which all but $8,756 went to Clinton (Swan 2016). At an extreme, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Board only contributed money to Hillary Clinton (Krayden 2016). These articles all 
suggest this to be evidence that the agency is Democratic. Recent scholarly work by Chen and 
1An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, known better as the Hatch Act of 1939, restricts the political 
behavior of federal employees in the executive branch under federal law. Importantly for this article, campaign 
contributions are not restricted behavior under this Act or any of the subsequent amendments. 
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Johnson (2015) characterized agency ideology using campaign contributions by agency 
employees to estimate agency preferences. The general assumption that undergirds these facts 
and estimates is that the aggregation of these individual actions translates to some general 
sentiment about the preferences of the agency. 
However, such claims above about campaign contributions expressing the will of 
agencies skip an important step. Campaign contributions to candidates seeking federal office 
must disclose the occupation and employer of the contributor. This makes for easy identification 
of the contributions of federal employees, but it also potentially conflates the aggregation of 
those donations with the collective preference of the agency. Each contribution could be the 
result of personal factors independent of the agency where that individual works that makes 
aggregating the contributions inappropriate. Past scholarly work suggests federal employees 
remain politically neutral to enhance agency reputation (Carpenter 2010, Carpenter 2001, 
Carpenter and Krause 2012, Kaufman 1981, Miller and Whitford 2016, Wilson 1989). What 
motivated the campaign contribution of federal employees: the collective will of the agency, the 
strategic context of the bureaucrat’s job, or the bureaucrat’s individual political preferences? 
Appreciating why bureaucrats become campaign contributors allows for a richer understanding 
of the politicization of staffing decisions in the executive branch and the involvement of federal 
employees in presidential elections. 
The article finds little evidence of collective action from employees but rather individual 
actions that express the individual’s values. Those values can be either a political preference or a 
function of the strategic context where that individual works. In addition to gaining 
understanding about what motivates campaign contributions, the article speaks to the relationship 
that federal employees have with their political principal, specifically the president. Individual 
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characteristics are more associated with changes in the probability of making a campaign 
contribution. Appointees, partisans, ideologues and those with insulated personnel provisions 
contribute more frequently. Moreover, the patterns of partisan careerists giving differ depending 
upon who occupies the Oval Office. 
The results suggest administrations deal with heterogeneous agencies and individuals in 
managing the bureaucracy. Some agencies are ideologically mismatched with the president. 
However, even in agencies that are aligned with the president, some individuals tasked with 
enacting the president’s agenda might not support the current administration. This might seem to 
limit even more the ability of the president to control the administrative state. However, the same 
is also true of co-partisans working in mismatched agencies. Campaign contributions might serve 
as the signal by which civil servants signal their support of the current administration, thus 
making it easier for the administration to position more sympathetic civil servants in seats of 
power. 
2.1 Federal Employees as Political Actors 
One interesting feature of presidential campaigns is that presidents preside over 
individuals who may or may not have supported their candidacy. As Aberbach and Rockman 
note, “personnel working for the state could also reflect the partisan or attitudinal profile of the 
population” (2000, p.47). This suggests that even with goals of neutrality, people working for 
government enter their jobs with diverse political preferences amongst other traits. Such a 
distribution is consistent with one of Krislov and Rosenbloom’s characterization of 
representative bureaucracy (1981). Civil servants have clients, and in order to provide best for 
those citizens needing the agencies assistance, individuals in the agency ought to share some of 
14 
the traits of those citizens they assist. Yet, Putnam finds “correlations between social background 
and policy preferences are remarkably weak and unpredictable” (1976, p. 96-97). Moreover, 
Aberbach and Rockman (1981) found closer ties between individual ideology and the department 
the individual works in, rather than the sociopolitical origins of that individual. While this 
suggests agency life is not a constant political battle, it does leave open the possibility for civil 
servants to possess beliefs counter to their political principals. Such a discrepancy could lead to 
conflict. 
Federal employs have a long history in the United States of participating in elections, 
specifically concerning campaign contributions (Corrado, et al. 1997). The first restrictions 
placed on campaign contributions came in 1867 outlawing naval officers from soliciting 
dockworkers for contributions (Naval Appropriations Bill 1867). Such regulation sought to 
curtail a particular practice by a very specific set of federal employees. The regulation of the 
political activities of federal employees more generally first entered law with the Pendleton Civil 
Service Reform Act (1883). Most notably the Pendleton Act brought about merit based hiring 
and firing practices for federal employees. In addition to introducing a merit based system, the 
Pendleton Act forbid campaign solicitations on government property (Maranto 1993). Simply 
having meritorious hiring practices does not remove unwarranted political influence in the 
administrative state. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, commonly known as the 
Hatch Act (1939), was enacted following allegations of Democrats using Works Progress 
Administration jobs in key states to employ contributors (Clement 1971; Leupold 1975). The 
Hatch Act and nearly 80 years of subsequent amendments spell out the permissible and 
impermissible activities of federal employees. Concerning campaign contributions, currently (as 
of the amendments passed in 2012) federal employees are allowed to contribute to federal offices 
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and candidates just like any other citizen, subject to the current limitations allowed by the 
Federal Election Commission under the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002. 
However, unlike other citizens, federal employees have a long history of norms and regulations 
regarding campaign contributions. Understanding the evolution of this dynamic is critical for 
evaluations of how federal employees participate in elections. 
Federal employees, despite normative desires for neutral behavior, can have political 
preferences of their own and have the opportunity to engage political action. Aberbach and 
Rockman (1976) noted Richard Nixon faced and administrative state populated by members of 
his opposing party. In later work, they also demonstrate that three different Republican 
administrations sought to rebalance the partisan distribution of federal employees in favor of 
more loyal civil servants (Aberbach and Rockman 2000). This sort of influence, as framed by 
Moe (1985), is the natural byproduct of presidents seeking to place loyal individuals in the 
federal government in order to see the president’s agenda enacted.   
The previous characterization of federal employees as political actors focuses on the 
desires of the president. But, there is another side to this narrative. The reason why presidents 
must trade competence for loyalty is that federal employees have preferences of their own that 
they act upon in ways that could run counter to what the president desires. Golden (2001) notes 
that federal employees that disagree with policy have the option to either exit government, voice 
their discontent, demonstrate loyalty through responsiveness, or neglect their own personal 
feelings and comply with the new administration. Given limited options, federal employees 
could also turn to elections to voice their desire for political change. If they are, those federal 
employees engaging in political activities do so in ways that could systematically correlate with 
their job. 
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Coordinated agency action would also be associated with agency characteristics. Those 
features would likely be design features seeking to remove the agency from politics. If agencies 
are resolving a collective action problem, agency size surely correlates with the probability of 
making a campaign contribution. Additionally, agency structure such as insulation produces 
different agency outcomes depending upon the degree of insulation from political actors (Selin 
2015). Also, the relative influence from political actors (Lee and Whitford 2012, Marvel and 
McGrath 2016) likely correlates with the political participation of individual employees in the 
federal government as individuals that report more policy influence from political actors have a 
greater interest in seeing a particular party control the executive or legislative branch. These 
agency characteristics situate employees in different agency contexts that could influence the 
decisions of the individual to participate in elections or the ability of the agency to act 
collectively in the electoral arena. 
 
2.2 Federal Employees as Non-Political Actors 
The possibility that federal employees participate politically competes with considerable 
evidence that professional norms and agency reputations motivate federal employees to act in an 
apolitical fashion. Kaufman (1981) and Wilson (1989) frequently note administrative behavior 
motivated by the desire to maintain an agency’s reputation. Carpenter (2010) posits agency 
reputations being staked to how well an agency does its job, the honesty of the agency, the 
capacity of the agency to carry out its mission, and the procedural compliance with rulings 
regarding the agency. While these concepts might not be related to one another, explicitly absent 
but implicitly present in this construction is the role of the agency avoiding fights with political 
actors. Carpenter and Krause (2012) suggest agencies rely heavily on reputation to avoid 
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political alienation and maintain support. Borrowing their sailing metaphor, administrators rely 
heavily on the reputation of the agency to navigate these potentially choppy political waters. One 
benefit of an enhanced reputation for agencies is increased authority and autonomy (Carpenter 
2001; Wilson 1989). Most recently, Miller and Whitford (2016) demonstrate that bureaucrats 
still view being above politics as a way to gain credibility with political actors. In sum, these 
accounts suggest that professional norms carry the day and federal employees rise out of the 
political morass to execute law in an objective and apolitical fashion because that is what 
provides the greatest benefit for the agency.  
While the two previous characterizations of the behaviors of federal employees perhaps 
suggest a theoretical conflict regarding agency behavior, this is not necessarily the case and this 
paper does not seek to horserace the competing explanations. Rather, both accounts suggest a 
heterogeneity in the composition of the types of employees working within an agency. 
Individuals in some agencies perhaps refrain from entering the electoral arena. Others in a 
different context within the federal government might be more likely to participate. 
Understanding this variation, if it exists, allows for a nuanced understanding of behaviors within 
the bureaucracy and presidential control. 
 
2.3 Motivations of Giving  
Traditionally, motivations of giving are individual actions that fall into two categories. First, a 
campaign contribution could indicate the political preferences, either partisan or ideological, of 
the donor (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995, Francia, et al. 2003, Bonica 2013).2 This will be 
referred to as expressive giving. The logic behind this type of donation would be donors want in 
                                                     
2Recent scholarship has used campaign contributions to estimate the ideal points of candidates as well as donors 
(Bonica 2013). 
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office representatives similar to their own beliefs. As such, donors open their wallets to help 
likeminded individuals into office. This is more or less akin to the opinion of the majority of the 
Supreme Court regarding the nature of contributions since the Buckley v. Valeo (1976) decision 
equating contributions with speech. 
The second category of giving is strategic. While there are many forms of strategic 
contributions, at its heart this form of contribution is to better the donor’s self-interest with little 
concern for general policy preferences. Advocates of restrictive campaign finance law fear this 
form of giving where moneyed individuals buy access for favorable policy through campaign 
contributions to political actors. Recently, several Supreme Court rulings3 have heightened these 
concerns as but a few wealthy individuals fund candidates through new legal avenues (Kang 
2010, Kang 2012, Briffault 2012). The strategic motivations for giving can take on many 
different forms. For this article, specifically a strategic contribution relates to the preferences 
housed by individuals regarding the individual’s career and agency. 
While these auspicious donors grab attention and headlines, the motivations of these 
contributions and other donations remain largely anecdotal (Hill and Huber (2015) is a recent 
notable exception). Modern presidential candidates need hundreds of millions of dollars to win 
the Oval Office in a modern campaign (Adkins and Dowdle 2002, Busch and Mayer 2003, 
Wayne 2012). One of the prominent ways this money flows into a candidate’s campaign coffers 
is through contributions from individual donors. While McCutcheon v FEC (2014) recently 
removed aggregate caps on individual donors making direct contributions to federal candidates, 
The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) still limits donors to any one 
                                                     
3 Recent SCOTUS rulings such as FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007), Davis v. FEC (2008), Citizens United 
v. FEC (2010), McCutheon v. FEC (2014) all have lessened restrictions on campaign contributions or money in 
campaigns. 
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candidate at $2,000 per election per candidate indexed for inflation.4 The hope is by placing a 
cap on the size of contributions any one individual can make to a candidate, many citizens can 
give the maximum legal amount. If donors were hoping for access to the candidate, the intent of 
the law is the volume of competing voices would crowd out those attempting to purchase 
influence.5 Whether or not this actually occurs is an empirical question that remains largely 
unanswered, but at least one recent incident forced presidential candidate Rick Perry to quip "I 
raised about $30 million, and if you're saying I can be bought for $5,000, I'm offended” (NPR 
2011). The mere asking of the question suggests some still believe the caps insufficient in 
preventing strategic contributions. Pinning down these strategic factors motivating a campaign 
contribution is necessary to understand the genesis of campaign contributions.  
Federal employees provide a unique avenue to consider strategic giving in detail. Despite 
the Weberian (1946) desire of neutral competence, bureaucrats are political actors within 
government (Lowi 1969, Wilson 1989). Some individuals opt into civil service with the desire to 
influence policy (Gailmard and Patty 2007, Gailmard 2010). Others enter into the federal 
government via political appointment (Lewis 2008). In the past, campaign contributions by 
federal employees were kickbacks for patronage positions (Theriault 2003, Lewis 2007). Past 
reforms, the Pendleton Act specifically, sought to remove this form of quid pro quo exchange 
from appointees to elected officials. All of these factors have important implications for how the 
federal government operates but the pervasiveness of each remains largely unknown in a modern 
setting. This article aims to begin to shed light on this issue. To do so unique data of federal 
                                                     
4 The caps were $2,000, $2,300 and $2,500 in 2004, 2008 and 2012 respectively in one election cycle for an 
individual donor. This means any one citizen could give $5,000 in 2012, the maximum contributions in both the 
general and primary elections. 
5 In other words, the rational actor wanting to purchase access sees thousands of other donors making similar 
contributions and realizes that her contribution is not unique enough to garner special attention from the candidate. 
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employees must be collected. The next section describes such data.  
 
2.4 Data 
To begin to consider the campaign contribution behavior of federal employees requires novel 
data. First, both contributors and those that did not contribute must be present. Donor files only 
provide information about the givers. In better understanding why someone gives money to a 
presidential candidate, one must consider the contributor’s peers who opted not to give. Second, 
personal beliefs that are not readily observable must be included in the analysis. To observe these 
qualities, scholars typically turn to survey instruments. In this case, the Survey for the Future of 
Government Service (SFGS) surveyed top careerists and appointees in the United States federal 
government.6 The SFGS in 2007 and 2014 used the Federal Yellow Pages (FYP) to generate a 
sample of highly ranked federal employees. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) publicly 
discloses all contributions made to federal candidates over $200.7 These FEC records were 
merged with two SFGS surveys. Unique identifiers between each dataset matched the survey 
responses to the campaign contribution records published by the FEC.8 
The merging of the first survey with 2004 and 2008 contribution records revealed 845 
and 1,321 contributions, respectively, made by the population sampled in the survey to any 
                                                     
6 For full details of each survey please see Clinton et al. (2012) for the 2008 SFGS survey and 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/research/sfgs.php for the 2014 SFGS survey 
7 The $200 threshold is an aggregate total of contributions made to a given candidate. As such, campaigns are 
required to disclose smaller donations if those donations in sum add up to $200 or more. 
8 Specifically, first name, last name and state of the survey respondent had to match a contribution in the FEC’s 
records. In addition, Washington D.C., Maryland and Virginia were considered the same state as not to miss 
bureaucrats who commute from the suburbs to the D.C. metro. To ensure that false positives were not included in 
this matching process, individual’s employer as disclosed in the FEC’s data must match the agency listed in the FYP 
or indicate employment by the federal government generally. General employment contributions constituted ~10% 
in a given cycle and findings are consistent even with their exclusion. 
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federal office. Removing repeat contributions,9 contributions to other offices and those that did 
not respond to the survey, 75 survey respondents (3.37%) contributed to a presidential candidate 
in 2004 and 150 survey respondents (6.74%) contributed to a presidential candidate in 2008. In 
2012 with the second SFGS survey, 2,272 contributions were made from the sample to a 
federally registered entity. Again removing duplicate contributions, donations to candidates for 
other office and those that did not respond, 150 survey respondents (4.22%) donated money to a 
presidential candidate.10 These contributions largely went to the nominees for the two major 
parties.11 This compares with roughly 3-4% of the population contributing money to office 
(Bonica, McCarty, et al. 2013) and 4-9% of medical doctors (Bonica, Rosenthal and Rothman 
2014). 
            The unique data generated has several desirable properties. First, by selecting a sample 
based off a criterion other than making a campaign contribution, the evaluation of similar givers 
and non-givers is possible. Second, because the contributions went directly to candidates, no 
ambiguity exists about the intended destination of the contribution and the propensity to give to a 
presidential candidate. Third, having survey responses to political questions as well as job 
function questions for federal employees allows for the measurement of concepts that have clear 
ties to behavior that might motivate a campaign contribution but are not readily observable. 
Taking these unique facets collectively, a better understanding of campaign contributions as well 
as the relationship federal employees have with the president and presidential candidates is 
possible.  
                                                     
9 For example, someone giving $50 to a presidential candidate for five months need only be counted once in terms 
of their decision to contribute or not. 
10 Nonqualified PACs associated with campaigns were treated as a contribution to the candidate for the purpose of 
this analysis. Therefore, money directed to the Obama Victory Fund would be a contribution to a presidential 
candidate whereas a contribution to ActBlue would not. For descriptive statistics of the sample, not just survey 
respondents, see table A1 in the Appendix A. 
11 For full details of which candidates received contributions from respondents, see table A1 in Appendix A 
  
22 
 
 
2.5 Expressive Giving 
Expressive giving can be measured by traditional survey measures of partisanship and ideology. 
Partisanship was measured on a five-point scale, with independents in the middle of the scale, 
partisans on the ends and “leaners” in-between. Ideology was measured on a seven point scale 
with moderates in the middle and very conservative or liberal responses on the ends of the scale. 
Both variables were rescaled to have the moderate or independent category be zero, with 
increases away from zero to be increases in partisanship or ideology.12 This will be referred to as 
the absolute deviation of these measures and appear as |PID| and |Ideology| in the upcoming 
models. The expectation for each would be partisans and ideologues contribute more frequently 
than moderates and independents.  
 
2.6 Strategic Giving 
Both surveys as well as other governmental resources measure the agency context of the 
bureaucrat. Beginning with the FYP, all individuals sampled note the type of appointment for 
each bureaucrat. In this article presidential appointees requiring confirmation, presidential 
appointees, non-career members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Schedule C 
employees are considered appointees. The FYP notes careerists as a career member of the SES, 
members of Senior Foreign Service, or simply a careerist. Whether someone is an appointee or 
careerist could alter the individual’s probability of giving. Given historical precedents, 
appointees should give more frequently than careerists (Lewis 2008). An indicator variable 
(Careerist) accounts for this in the upcoming estimates. 
                                                     
12 Cross party giving would complicate interpretations of such a coding scheme. However, across three election 
cycles only 11, 0.92% of all presidential contributions, where given by members of one party to a candidate of the 
other party. For more detail, see Appendix B. 
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The FYP also provides the geographical location of where the bureaucrat works. Past 
work as indicated that different areas of the country give at varying rates (Bramlett, Gimpel and 
Lee 2011, Mitchell, et al. 2015, Sebold, et al. 2012). In the case of these federal employees, the 
proximity to Washington, D.C. constitutes a clear geographical bound that would differentiate 
bureaucrats. Those located in and around the Washington, D.C. area are more likely to engage 
with political actors and have more politicians in their proximity. This would leave those 
bureaucrats to behave as political intimates describe by Francia et al. (2003). Additionally, past 
surveys of donors have indicated that the most common reason for donating to a campaign was 
the candidates asked the donors to give money (Francia, et al. 2003, Brown, Powell and Wilcox 
1995). As such, those living in the Washington, D.C. area should give more frequently than those 
bureaucrats living elsewhere in the country should. An indicator variable (DC) of if the 
individual works in Washington, D.C. accounts for this in consideration. 
The 2014 SFGS asked what parts of the bureaucrat’s job the individual respondent 
valued. For example, respondents indicated how important having decisions over policy 
outcomes (Values Policy) as well as career aspirations to moving to higher ranks in the federal 
government (Values Move Up) were asked to the respondents. In both instances, as bureaucrats 
place greater value on either making policy or moving up in government they should also be 
more likely to contribute. Those that value policy could view the contribution as gaining access 
while those that want to move up in the government are attempting to curry favor with potential 
political allies. This type of contribution varies from expressive giving, as the donations made 
are not in service of a broad political belief but rather the bureaucrat’s career motivated 
preferences. 
Past work has indicated that wealthier citizens are more likely to contribute than those 
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that make less money (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Unlike most citizens, wages of 
federal employees are disclosed to the public. Using FedSmith, the wages of all bureaucrats in 
the 2014 sample were collected.13 The expectation again would be that bureaucrats making more 
money are also more likely to make a campaign contribution. To account for skewing in salaries, 
the natural log of salaries (ln(Salary)) will be used in the upcoming models. 
The SFGS surveys also hold valuable insight into who the bureaucrats are in contact with 
during their daily job functions. By a similar logic as to why someone in D.C. would be more 
likely to contribute money to presidential candidates, bureaucrats that have increased contact 
with the White House (White House Contact) or Congressional committees (Committee Contact) 
should also be more likely to contribute.  
 
2.7 Agency Characteristics 
If agencies are acting collectively in elections then agency characteristics ought to vary 
systematically with the probability of making a campaign contribution. The SFGS also contains 
response items that measure the ideologies’ of the different federal agencies. Clinton and Lewis 
(2008) estimate the agency ideal points from the 2008 survey while Richardson, Clinton and 
Lewis (2018) estimate the agency ideal points for the 2014 survey. The expectation would be 
that the more ideologically extreme agencies house bureaucrats that are more politically engaged 
and therefore more likely to contribute to political contests. These ideal points, like individual 
ideology and party identification variables, were adjusted to be the absolute deviations away 
from the moderate value (|Agency Ideology|).  
How insulated the agency is from other political actors might also be associated with the 
                                                     
13 Because the pay scheduling of the federal government creates a skewed distribution, the natural log of these 
salaries were taken and included in the model that follows. 
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probability of its employees contributing. As Selin (2015) notes, agency insulation is a 
multifaceted concept that exist both on the policy insulation dimension as well as a dimension of 
how insulated personnel within the agency are from political actors. Selin recovers each type of 
insulation for each office in the SFGS survey. The expectation would be that increased insulation 
is associated with the freedom to contribute because there would not be fear of retribution from 
the political actors as power changes hand between the two parties. Policy Insulation and 
Personnel Insulation in the coming models account for both dimensions estimated. 
Agencies also differ in terms of the composition of people they employ. FedCube, 
provided by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), reports anonymized quarterly 
information on nearly 2 million federal employees. In the subsequent models, the September file 
for each relevant year is used to construct percent of professional, technical or clerical employees 
within each office. The OPM data were matched to each of the 255 offices in the SFGS sample. 
From this, the percent of each office that constituted one of the categories mentioned above 
could be calculated. In the upcoming models, % Professional is the percent of the office that is 
reported to be a professional employee and the ln(Agency Size) is the natural log of the total 
number of employees reported to be working in the agency. Appendix D considers alternative 
categories of employment from this data. 
Finally, the policymaking environment might influence the desire of the agency to act in 
the electoral arena. To account for this survey items were averaged asking how influential the 
White House (White House Policy Influence) and Congressional committees (Congressional 
Committee Influence) were in the policy making process within the agency. Agencies reporting 
more involvement from these actors ought to be more likely to participate in elections through 
campaign contributions. Additionally, respondents were asked how important rulemaking was 
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for their office. Taking the average value of that response by office (Rulemaking Importance) 
captures the regulatory environment of the office with those agencies that participate more in 
rulemaking being more likely to contribute. 
 
2.8 Results for 2012 
The binary nature of the outcome, either giving or not giving to a presidential candidate, 
makes a probit estimation appropriate. Additionally, the decision to give has no partisan 
direction as bureaucrats could give to either Republican or Democratic candidates, leaving one 
binary outcome to consider in this paper.14 Also, Heinrich and Hill note, it is “challenging to 
think of a governmental context in which a multilevel conceptualization would not be 
appropriate” (2010, 836). See Resh (2014, 2015) for multiple applications accounting for these 
features. However, given the nature of the data, the intraclass correlation is insufficient to 
warrant a multilevel model. The probit coefficients are reported in the body of the text to allow 
for an easy discussion of the magnitude of the change provided by the coefficients. What follows 
in this paper are probit estimations, unless otherwise noted, with the multilevel models reported 
in Appendix C. Importantly, the substantive conclusions drawn from the estimates do not vary 
between the different modelling decisions. 
The results that follow consistently demonstrate three critical findings. First, there is 
consistent evidence of expressive giving, as partisans are more likely to give than independents. 
Second, the context the individuals works in is systematically associated with changes in the 
probability of making a campaign contribution. Careerists are less likely to give than appointee 
                                                     
14 Additionally a total of 11 individuals across the three election cycles identified as one party and contributed to a 
candidate from the other party. The observed lack of cross party giving is consistent with past studies of shared 
donors during presidential campaigns (Dowdle, et al. 2013). This lack of cross party giving should assuage concerns 
of removing partisan direction from the dependent and some independent variables. 
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and personnel insulation increases the probability of contributing. Additionally, policy insulation 
decreases the probability of contributing while those that place a greater value on policy are 
more likely to contribute. Third, no evidence of coordinated action by similarly situated agencies 
was found, which suggests the decision to contribute is largely individualistic and not the 
coordinated effort of agencies seeking to exert influence.  
To begin to explore the motivations of campaign contributions, the first model in Table 1 
uses information available for the whole sample, not just survey respondents. As expected, 
careerists are 8.4 percentage points less likely to give than appointed officials are. While this 
change may not appear particularly large in terms of the size of the increase, it is important to 
remember for this and the subsequent predicted probabilities slightly less than five percent of 
respondents contributed to a presidential candidate.15 As such, even small changes would 
nontrivially change the proportion of the sample that opted to contribute to a presidential contest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                     
15 Kanthak and Krause (2010) capitalize on their dyadic design interpreting their estimates into the number 
of contributions particular candidates could expect to receive. However, that relationship between House members 
and Leadership PACs is different in that the plausibility of each donor having a dyadic relationship with every 
candidate is different enough such interpretations are not appropriate for this article. 
  
28 
 
Table 2.1: Probit Estimations of Bureaucrats Giving to Presidential Candidates, 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Give 2012 Give 2012 Give 2012 Give 2012 
     
Careerist -1.049*** (0.051) -1.003*** (0.180) -1.279*** (0.244)  
     
ln(Salary) 0.823*** (0.106) 0.261 (0.380) 0.354 (0.507)  
     
|PID|  0.336* (0.147) 0.694* (0.282)  
     
|Ideology|  0.076 (0.086) 0.109 (0.119)  
     
Values Policy  0.137 (0.085) 0.226* (0.102)  
     
Values Move Up  -0.102 (0.058) -0.096 (0.068)  
     
DC  0.240 (0.197) 0.059 (0.200)  
     
Presidential Contact  -0.0334 (0.070) -0.098 (0.095)  
     
Committee Contract  0.121 (0.082) -0.004 (0.100)  
     
|Agency Ideology|   0.208 (0.122) 0.010 (.006) 
     
% Professional   -0.318 (0.370) -0.004 (.0178) 
     
ln(Agency Size)   0.033 (0.063) -0.006 (.003) 
     
Policy Insulation   -0.275* (0.114) .0003 (.003) 
     
Personnel Insulation   0.264** (0.096) .004 (.007) 
     
Context Controls  No No Yes No 
     
Constant -10.77*** 
(1.256) 
-5.13 
(4.525) 
-6.025 
(5.981) 
0.077*** 
(0.010) 
Estimation  Probit Probit Probit OLS 
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: Models 1 and 2 estimate robust standard errors as the measures are individualistic. Model 3 clusters errors by 
office with the inclusion of group measures. Estimating models with clustered standard errors for Models 1 and 2 
does not alter the substantive conclusions drawn from the estimates. Model 4 uses OLS to estimate an agency level 
model. Context Controls includes controls for White House and  Policy Influence, and Rulemaking Importance. 
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The next model considers individual predictors of why a federal employee would make a 
campaign contribution. First, the inclusion of these variables into the specification does not 
substantively change the results from the first model. Second, partisanship has a 3.5 percentage 
point increase in giving while the marginal change for ideology is indistinguishable from zero, 
suggesting for bureaucrats, increases in partisanship makes a contribution more likely while no 
statistically discernable change is associated with increases in ideology.16 Individual 
characteristics about the respondents work are not associated with changes in the probability of 
contributing. As the results from the second model indicate, valuing policy is positively 
associated with the probability of donating to a presidential candidate whereas moving up in 
government is negatively associated with giving. That said while both approach conventional 
levels of statistical significance, neither clear the traditional p < .05 threshold. Model 2 also 
reveals little change in the substantive significance estimates in the previous specification. 
Careerists are still less likely to give than appointees are, but now salary does not have a 
statistically significant association with the probability of giving. 
While the data might not warrant a multilevel model, agency characteristics might still be 
associated with an individual’s decision to make a campaign contribution. Model 3 in Table 1 
incorporates agency specific characteristics. While most agency traits are not associated with a 
change in predicted probability, the insulation measures now explains associated changes in the 
probability of giving. Individuals in agencies with more personnel protections are associated 
with higher rates of contributions while those in agencies with greater policy insulation see a 
decrease in the associated change in the probability of making a campaign contribution. 
Additionally, with the agency factors controlled for, an increase in the value of policy for the 
                                                     
16 One explanation for this finding could stem from party identification being too strongly correlated with ideology. 
These variables are correlated a 0.30 in the 2014 SFGS and 0.32 in the 2008 SFGS which should alleviate some 
concerns with multicollinearity. Appendix B discusses this relationship in detail. 
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respondent is associated with an increased probability of contributing. These nuanced factors 
behind the motivation for making a contribution do not change the substantive significance of 
partisans being more likely to make a campaign contribution while careerists are less likely to 
make a campaign contribution. Conditional relationships between partisanship and values are 
explored in Appendix E. 
Finally, if agencies are systematically acting in elections through campaign contributions 
it is necessary to demonstrate agency characteristics as the sole predictor of aggregate agency 
behavior, Model 4 estimates agency characteristics predicting the percent of the agency that 
contributed to a presidential candidate in 2012. From this estimation, there is little evidence of 
systematic change in the percent of the agency that votes relative to only agency level 
characteristics. This result is not surprising given the small intraclass correlation in the multilevel 
models. Appendix F shows agency average models for all years used in this paper. Finding no 
evidence of agency traits predicting giving demonstrates that agencies that share traits do not act 
systematically with regards to campaign contributions. This does not rule out that any one 
agency is not contributing in a coordinated fashion. Such a line of inquiry requires different data, 
namely qualitative evidence of agency coordination, that is not available for this study. 
 
2.9 Results for 2008 and 2004 
The results presented in Table 1 are for only one election cycle and one administration. 
Considering other election years surrounding the earlier SFGS survey allows for the analysis of 
different election years and a different administration in power. Table 2 reports the probit 
estimations of contributing to a presidential candidate in 2008 and 2004. Sample wide 
characteristics do not exist to estimate a model from the full sample. Additionally, some 
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questions asked in 2014 were either not asked in the earlier survey or are sufficiently different to 
be incomparable to one another so the individual and combined model for 2008 and 2004 are 
presented. 
Table 2.2: Probit Estimation Contribution to a Presidential Candidate. 2004-2012 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Give Pres 2008 Give Pres 2008 Give Pres 2004 Give Pres 2004 
Careerist -0.655*** 
(0.105) 
-0.583*** 
(0.141) 
-0.654*** 
(0.154) 
-0.510* 
(0.234) 
|PID| 0.306** 
(0.099) 
0.263* 
(0.131) 
0.612*** 
(0.182) 
0.747** 
(0.257) 
|Ideology| 0.067 
(0.048) 
0.071 
(0.064) 
0.138* 
(0.070) 
0.0448 
(0.087) 
White House Contact 0.164*** 
(0.050) 
0.125 
(0.087) 
0.124** 
(0.045) 
0.224* 
(0.087) 
Committee Staff 
Contact 
-0.059 
(0.066) 
-0.006 
(0.083) 
-0.0557 
(0.068) 
-0.0244 
(0.010) 
% Professional 0.819* 
(0.325) 
0.259 
(0.393) 
ln(Agency Size) -0.107* 
(0.042) 
0.00606 
(0.039) 
|Agency Ideology| -0.006 
(0.118) 
-0.104 
(0.129) 
Constant -1.75*** 
(0.228) 
-1.17* 
(0.479) 
-2.71*** 
(0.396) 
-3.24*** 
(0.689) 
Observations 1883 1210 1883 1210 
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by office. 
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Importantly, the key findings in 2012 hold across other election years in a different presidential 
administration.17 Careerists are less likely to give than appointees are. Partisans are more likely 
to give than independents. The inclusions of agency ideology and contact with political actors 
leave the key explanations substantively unaltered and are not predictive of contributions with a 
minor exception. In 2008, contact with the White House increases the probability of contributing. 
Additionally, larger agencies are associated with a decreased probability of making a campaign 
contribution in 2008. The results in Table 2 demonstrate the patterns observed in Table 1 persist 
in different election years. 
One consistent finding warrants additional analysis. Across election years, careerists were 
less likely to contribute to presidential candidates than appointees were. While this finding is 
consistent with past explanations of appointee behavior, the current analysis provides a unique 
opportunity to look at the behavior of careerists in a political context. Figure 1 displays the rates 
at which different partisans give in different election years. Several observations emerge from 
Figure 1. Frist, careerists do participate in elections by making campaign contributions. The 
exception is in 2004 when no Independents of the 220 that answered the survey contributed. 
Second, Democrats are giving at different rates depending upon the election year. Third, 
depending upon the election year, partisans give at rates that are different from one another. If 
partisanship were purely expressive, the rate of giving should be innate to the individual and not 
vary across elections. However, Figure 1 displays simply the rate at which partisan careerists 
give. Before making conclusive statements, it is necessary to examine if other factors explain the 
changing rates of partisan giving amongst careerists. 
17 Another concern could be the temporal nature of some of these responses. Having the earlier SFGS take place 
between two presidential administrations could complicate findings if the response items changed over time. If such 
changes were to occur, the findings should not look similar. However, the models estimated find similar increases in 
predicted probability but in terms of the direction of the effect but also the substantive size of the change in 
predicted probability. Such findings should alleviate concerns of changing opinions across time. 
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Figure 2.1: Careerist Giving by Party Identification 
 
Note: Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval for the proportion of the category that 
contributed.  
 
Table 3 uses similar models as Table 1 and 2, however this time only considering careerists. 
Partisanship undergoes a transformation as well, dropping the absolute deviation of partisanship 
and replacing it with indicator variables for Democrats and Republicans.18 What is clear from 
                                                     
18Because careerists were not selected by a partisan administration, differences between Republicans and Democrats 
within year are now comparable. In other words, any Democrat appointed by the Bush Administration likely has 
qualities that differentiate the appointee from other Democrats, making any discussion of partisanship misleading. 
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those estimates is Republicans and Democrats give at different rates from one another, and those 
rates vary by year. Beginning in 2004, partisanship provides no insight in the probability of 
contributing as Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to contribute, as tests regarding the 
difference between coefficients cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are the same.19 These 
estimates, however, change in the 2008 model, with Democrats being more likely to contribute 
than Republicans. Using the same sample of careerists, the probability of contributing changes in 
different election years. Moving to a different sample in 2012, the same pattern of Democrats 
being more likely to contribute than Republicans persists from 2008. The findings above suggest 
the rate at which partisan careerists give to presidential candidates varies by year. Republican 
careerists were equally likely to give in 2004 as Democrats, while Democrats are more likely to 
give in 2008 and 2012 than Republicans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Such a problem does not exists for careerist that transition from one administration to the next, so comparisons 
between Democrats and Republicans now are possible. One issue that arises is that in 2004 no independent 
careerists contributed to a presidential candidate. As such point estimates with independents as reference categories 
in that year are very large so the overall magnitude of the coefficient is not discussed. That said, the results are 
robust (not displayed) to excluding independents, differencing 2008 and 2004 and the inclusion of giving in 2004 as 
an explanatory variable in estimating 2008 giving. 
19 These results are consistent with models estimating both Republican and Democrat indicators with Independents 
as the reference category. Those results appear in Appendix H. 
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Table 2.3: Probit Estimation of Careerists Giving to Presidential Candidates, 2004-2012 
 (1) (1) (1) 
 Give 2012 Give2008 Give 2004 
    
|Agency Ideology| 0.016 0.074 -0.007 
 (0.116) (0.13) (0.147) 
    
DC 0.265 0.615* 0.397* 
 (0.184) (0.268) (0.201) 
    
|Ideology| 0.124 0.197* 0.0787 
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.090) 
    
Presidential Contact 0.135* -0.072 0.135 
 (0.063) (0.111) (0.122) 
    
Committee Contact -0.010 0.100 -0.082 
 (0.021) (0.064) (0.072) 
    
Democrat 0.584* 0.686 3.607*** 
 (0.276) (0.392) (0.185) 
    
Republican 0.123 0.111 3.748*** 
 (0.345) (0.462) (0.181) 
    
% Professional 0.667* 0.823* 0.592 
 (0.281) (0.349) (0.489) 
    
ln(Agency Size) -0.0115 -0.0954* 0.0197 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.05) 
    
Constant -3.03*** -2.77*** -6.34*** 
 -0.398 (0.572) (0.54) 
Observation 1747 1042 1042 
+ p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
To speculate some about why these patterns emerge, the clearest explanation stems from 
the changing electoral context. In 2004, a Republican incumbent controlled the White House. By 
2008, it seemed likely a Democrat would occupy the Oval Office and the same Democrat would 
be in office for a second term in 2012 (Bartels 2013). Perhaps these underlying circumstances 
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altered different partisan groups’ probability of giving. The strongest evidence of this 
interpretation lies in differences between 2004 and 2008. Recall, those samples are the same 
bureaucrats. Yet when the election year, and the context associated with that year changes, 
Democrats change their probability of contributing. This result is not a function of Republicans 
censoring their behavior. There was actually a slight increase in the number of contributions for 
John McCain over George W. Bush. Instead, the sizable increase lies with Democratic 
candidates receiving three times the number of contributions in 2008 when compared to 2004.20 
This finding is evidence of strategic giving, as context seems to be altering the probability of 
making a campaign contribution. The following interpretation receives support when considering 
the findings in 2012. With a new sample but still in the Obama administration, Democrats are 
more likely to give than Republicans are. If expressive characteristics of donors motivated the 
underlying propensity to give, clear election specific differences should not emerge along 
partisan lines. Yet the findings above demonstrate this exact behavior is occurring amongst 
careerists. The same sample demonstrates different behaviors in different election years and 
different samples demonstrate similar behaviors under the same administration. Such donation 
patterns are suggestive of strategic behavior being associated with giving, not just an innate 
probability of contributing.21 
 
                                                     
20Table A in Appendix A shows the number of campaign contributions received by presidential candidates in all 
three elections considered by survey respondents. 
21 One potentially puzzling result for careerists is the discrepancy between 2004 and 2012. Both deal with incumbent 
presidents seeking reelection, yet the partisans do not give in similar ways. Two key distinctions help in 
understanding this result. First, the Bush reelection was far more in doubt than Obama’s reelection bid. John Kerry 
led in the polls as late as July and August in 2004 
(http://www1.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2004/president/us/general_election_bush_vs_kerry-939.html#polls). 
Second, Democrats outnumber Republicans. If a Democratic careerist were to back a losing candidate, they would 
still work in an executive branch comprised a majority of copartisans. Republicans backing a loser return to a 
different environment where they are the political minority and are out of power.  
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2.10 Discussion 
Looking for trends across the years between the different models reveals consistent 
findings. First, bureaucrats display evidence of expressive giving. Partisans are more likely to 
make campaign contributions than independents. This result is consistent with past studies that 
characterized donor composition (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995, Francia, et al. 2003, 
Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee 2011). In some cases, this is also true for ideologues, though the 
magnitude of the change in predicted probabilities is always smaller than partisanship. All the 
expressive findings were robust and only trivially decreased by the inclusion of strategic 
motivations for donating money to a presidential candidate.  
Bureaucrats also contribute to presidential candidates for career-motivated reasons. 
Careerists are less likely to contribute to presidential campaigns than appointees are. This 
decrease in giving for careerists is quite large considering the propensity of the sample to give. 
Careerists appear to be participating less when it comes to making campaign contributions. There 
are several reasons for this observation. First, careerists could be staying away from political 
conflicts and maintaining the agency’s reputation by not contributing. Second, it could be that 
longer time horizons for federal employees compared to political actors make the appearance of 
picking a side unwise. That said the need to stay away from the political competitions for 
careerists is interesting. Future work should investigate the extent to which political retribution 
against out-party careerists alters the behavior of bureaucrats. 
There is greater suggestive evidence for career motivated strategic giving in 2012 when 
bureaucrats revealed their values about their career. Federal employees looking to alter policy are 
more likely to contribute to a presidential candidate. This behavior mirrors a story of access 
buying told about donors representing business interests. Like the private sector contributors 
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looking to influence the policy outcomes via campaign contributions to presidential candidates, 
those bureaucrats that place higher values on making policy also are more likely to contribute to 
presidential candidates. 
Another past explanation of giving was resource based (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995). People with more money are better equipped to contribute money to elections. In 2012, 
when salaries of federal employees are known, the simple models predicting giving found 
evidence of this expectation. However, as more explanations of giving were included into a 
model predicting giving behavior, the marginal change in predicted probability disappeared. This 
result suggests that salary varies with other strategic explanations of giving, not just simply 
making more money. In other words, simply having money does not make federal employees 
more likely to contribute. While it is likely a necessary condition to be able to give, ultimately 
the decision to part ways with one’s wealth needs something strategic or expressive to facilitate 
the contribution. This finding is important for scholars studying campaign contributions as 
simply having more money only coarsely correlates with an increased probability of giving to a 
presidential candidate for bureaucrats once other explanatory considerations are included in the 
specification. 
The outstanding question of if the collective action of donors should be inferred to be the 
preferences of the agency remains. The results above suggest campaign contributions are far 
more individualistic than they are the aggregation of individuals to resolve a collective action 
problem. Most agency characteristics were not associated with giving. Two exceptions were size 
of the agency and the insulation of individuals in the agency in some years. Regarding agency 
size, one could speculate that larger agencies present a more difficult collective action problem 
and therefore federal employees choose not to participate in this fashion. Interestingly, insulation 
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of top employees as constructed by Selin (2015), is associated with changes in the probability of 
making a campaign contribution. Individuals with greater job security through insulation are 
more likely to contribute money to a presidential candidate. This is particularly interesting 
because the individuals within the survey come from the upper echelons of the agency where the 
protections are in place most readily. This result is suggestive evidence that individuals that work 
within agencies with more insulation might be more likely to participate in the political process 
because they have additional protections and have less fear of retribution from political actors. 
Moreover, increased policy insulation is associated with a decreased probability of contributing. 
Considering a contribution like access buying, this is suggestive evidence that employees that are 
insulated in the policy making process do not make campaign contributions, even when 
controlling for how much those individuals value making policy.  
Three broader implications of this work merit further exploration. First, the inclusion of 
partisanship and ideology as predictors of giving result consistently in partisanship having a 
larger increase in the probability of giving. In some cases, the effect of ideology is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. While donors are more ideological than non-donors (Bramlett, 
Gimpel and Lee 2011), for presidential politics with bureaucrats, it is partisanship that has a 
greater motivating force. Perhaps this finding is a result of presidential politics being the best-
case scenario to observe partisan contributions from federal employees. Money clearly goes to 
candidates of one of the two major parties. The money required to win office also is massive and 
requires contributions from citizens all across the country with diverse preferences. Under these 
circumstances, one could envision partisans participating in presidential elections more so than 
other elections. This could also be a quirk of federal employees, but repeating this procedure 
with different survey samples would reveal if this pattern persists. 
  
40 
 
The second question these results spur relates to the downstream consequences of a 
contribution made by a federal employee. Are there payouts to employees that contributed to a 
presidential candidate? The 2012 results at least plausibly suggest contributors that have a 
greater stake in policymaking contribute. Tracking the career trajectories of those that 
contributed would reveal job consequences regarding both the trajectory of the employee as well 
as the work output and placement of that official. Documenting the career paths of those 
employees would answer if campaign contributions were detrimental or helpful to promotions as 
well as if those that contribute get better access to policymaking positions.  
Third, estimating models with just ideology have little substantive differences in terms of 
how ideology relates to the propensity to contribute. This leaves the interpretation of the results 
to be that contributions are a function of partisanship, not ideology. This is an interesting finding 
because federal employees and agencies generally bear the moniker of an ideology, not a party. 
The potential conflation of these two notions is an interesting line of inquiry, suggesting that 
while contributions do not appear to be an agency specific phenomenon given the results in the 
paper, other areas of agency action might be partisan and not ideological.  
 
2.11 Conclusion 
The decision to make a campaign contribution is a complicated calculation of strategic 
and expressive factors. When examining federal employees to limit the complicated strategic 
environment of the population at large, clear evidence of increases in the probability of giving 
exists for partisans and in some instances ideologues. Evidence of career motivated strategic 
giving complements the expressive giving results as careerists are less likely to give relative to 
appointees. That said, the strategic giving seems to stop at the individual and is not 
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systematically used by agencies to resolve a collective action problem. Scholars using campaign 
finance records should be mindful of the motivations that generated the contribution when using 
such data in their analyses. 
 In addition to providing a better understanding of campaign contributions, this article 
provides valuable insight into the heterogeneity of political preferences in the bureaucracy the 
president faces when attempting to oversee the executive branch. Not all bureaucrats behave in 
the same way or have the same political opinions. While breaking employees into categories 
based off appointment type helps in explaining this variation, there are differences within those 
categories that stem from the personal beliefs and values of individual employees. These 
differences likely have other consequences related to the execution of governmental action in the 
modern administrative state. To understand better the modern administrative state and how 
presidents interact with federal agencies, future work should attempt to map the values of 
individual employees, as those values likely are consequential for outcomes produced by the 
federal administrative state and the ability of the president to control policy decisions.  
Federal civil servants contributing to presidential races provide several important 
implications students of the presidency and the executive branch. First, presidents face an 
executive branch with diverse missions and personnel. Not only may the purpose of the agency 
not align with the president, the civil servants within agencies may not support that president 
relative to the other party’s candidate in the previous election. This opens up the possibility of 
resistance to the new administrations agenda by these mismatched civil servants. But the 
ideological misalignment cuts both ways. In agencies that the administration might anticipate 
this resistance, some civil servants, via campaign contributions, could signal their willingness to 
cooperate with the new administration. This could lead to those individuals being placed in seats 
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of power that would enable greater control of the agency beyond what the political appointees 
provide the administration. Future work should consider if individuals making campaign 
contributions see more or less favorable job outcomes depending upon who occupies the Oval 
Office. 
 Second, federal agencies do not act as a monolith in elections via campaign contributions. 
Agencies are not attempting to control their principal in elections nor are they giving at rates that 
would suggest a strong signal from the agency to the administration. Rather, individuals give to 
their preferred candidate, with those that value policy being more likely to give. Such a result 
suggests that politics enters the executive branch, but only through individuals exercising their 
right to make a campaign contribution. In modern times, this information is publicly available, so 
it could signal support that would in turn benefit the civil servant in their career.   
 Finally, career civil servants behave strategically when making a campaign contribution. 
In addition to career aspirations correlating with giving noted above, the rates of giving by 
partisans shift in conjunction with the changing winds of American politics, even for career civil 
servants. This suggests that not all civil servants abstain from the political process. Future work 
should consider how the political engagements of civil servants in elections manifest in the 
career decisions and outcomes of federal employees.  
Chapter 3 
43 
Partisan Turnover in the Permanent Civil Service 
The surprise victory of Donald Trump, which sent shockwaves through the American 
electorate, also reverberated through the civil service. One poll of federal employees taken 
directly before the inauguration suggested that slightly over a quarter considered leaving 
government and, indeed, many have followed through by publicly resigning (Cox 2017; Federal 
Executive 2017). Some departing civil servants penned pleas to those remaining in government 
to resist the Trump administration: they did not want the President to be able to use civil 
servants’ expertise to legitimize the administration’s actions (Cohen 2016; Hennessey 2016). 
What the president might dismiss as the action of disgruntled Democrats might actually be 
indicative of a growing partisan battleground in the civil service. 
The anecdotal evidence of turnover among high-level civil servants during the Trump 
administration raises the more general question of the role politics plays in turnover in the 
permanent government. While the Trump administration’s relationship with the civil service 
seems particularly strained, some tension is common after elections. The Nixon administration, 
for example, fought what it believed to be a Democratic civil service (Aberbach and Rockman 
1976); the Reagan administration used targeted reassignment in the Environmental Protection 
Agency (Golden 2000); and, the Obama administration used czars to help control policy 
(Steinzor 2012). When confronting these political pressures, civil servants might prefer to exit 
government rather than carry out programs they disagree with. 
The original motivation for the creation of a professional civil service was to ensure an 
expert administration of the laws (Van Riper 1958). High levels of turnover undercut the quality 
and competence of the civil service, because lost human capital acquired on the job is costly to 
replace (Lewis 1991; Light 2008). The Washington Post Editorial Board felt so strongly about 
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this the Sunday after Donald Trump won the presidency they wrote: 
[O]ne shift guaranteed to damage the nation would be an exodus of smart, 
experienced and civic-spirited people from federal service. If good lawyers leave 
the Justice Department, less-experienced and less-principled ones may take their 
place. If seasoned diplomats leave their posts, those who will fill their shoes will 
have to conduct the nation’s foreign policy with less knowledge and fewer 
relationships abroad. Federal civil servants are not responsible for making policy, 
but they are responsible for lending their brains and expertise to the process of 
applying it, so that the wisdom of experience filters up even as policy comes 
down. More than ever, the country needs that process to continue. 
 
When civil servants opt to exit the public service, performance of federal programs is put at risk 
(see, e.g., Boylan 2004, Lewis 2008). Moreover, exit becomes a normatively troubling problem 
if political factors precipitate the decision to leave government as those losses change the 
composition of the federal workforce. 
Scholars have conducted important research illuminating different individual and 
contextual factors that predict exit for civil servants (see, e.g., Bertelli 2007; Lee and Whitford 
2008; Pitts et al. 2011; for good overviews on turnover see Abbasi and Hollman 2000; Grissom 
et al. 2015; Park and Shaw 2013). Absent from many studies is what makes agencies a unique 
and interesting organization: the role of politics. It is important to know if politics enters in the 
decision for individuals to exit the public service. Civil servants face similar decisions as other 
employees (e.g., the role of salary, benefits, retirement packages, diversity concerns, etc.). 
However, unlike private firms, agencies face a work environment where elected officials, with 
interests that could run counter to the mission of the agency, interfere in the work of the public 
employee.  
Recent work that does engage the role of politics provides competing predictions about 
how it should influence exit. Furthermore, the data restrictions of these studies limit our ability to 
arbitrate between these predictions. The extant empirical work that does consider politics relies 
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on either employment records or stated intent to exit in a survey (see, e.g., Bertelli and Lewis 
2013; Bolton et al. 2016; Pitts et al. 2011). However, government employment records have no 
data on an individual’s political beliefs and surveys do not observe someone actually quitting the 
public service.1 Each provide an incomplete snapshot. This paper bridges this gap by combining 
survey-based measures of partisanship with government employment records. This allows me to 
assess directly the role of politics in actual departure, rather than stated departure decisions.  
The paper proceeds with the following sections. First, it begins by reviewing past 
explanations for exit, focusing on the role of politics. The paper then describes the survey of civil 
servants and Office of Personnel Management records used to observe individual political beliefs 
and exit from government. It demonstrates that actual exit diverges from survey respondents’ 
stated exit intention. Next, a longitudinal analysis demonstrates that independents and those in 
moderate agencies are more likely to exit government than partisans and those working in more 
ideological agencies. While displaying these results, the paper highlights discrepancies between 
the conclusions one would reach using survey based measures of turnover intention compared to 
actual exit. To put these results into context, the paper discusses how the partisan distribution of 
the civil service can change over an administration given estimated exit rates. Finally, the paper 
addresses the generalizability of the results using early data from the Trump administration and 
concludes with a discussion of the implications for our conception of a neutral public 
administration. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 There can be a consequential difference between what people report they will do on a survey and what they 
actually do. Recent work looking a turnover for another public servant, teachers, found an 80 percent gap between 
exit intention on a survey and observed exit (DeAngelis et al. 2013). 
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3.1 Why Do Senior Civil Servants Exit Government?  
The National Commission on the Public Service warned of increased turnover due to an 
aging workforce in 1989. Dubbed the “quiet crisis” in the civil service, the commission warned 
of dire losses of human capital from an aging workforce and a lack of interest by college 
graduates in the most senior positions in government. At the time, only 3 percent of honors 
students sought jobs in the public service (Leadership for America 1989, p. 29), while 
retirements of Baby Boomers loomed. The capacity lost from this increased turnover and the 
dearth of talented replacements threatened the productivity of agencies spanning the entire 
government. Lewis (1991) concurred with the looming troubles due to an aging workforce and 
difficulties recruiting new talent, but suggested a decade remained to intervene and fix the 
problem. While the measurement of performance in public sector bureaucracies is difficult 
(Heckman, Heinrich and Smith 1997; Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002), a recent meta-analysis of 
organizational departures finds a negative correlation between turnover and performance (Park 
and Shaw 2013). 
Concerned with the negative effects of turnover, scholars have sought to identify its 
causes. Both individual and contextual factors may enter into a civil servant’s decision to leave 
government. These factors interact with individual civil servants personal beliefs and alter their 
propensity to exit. In addition to age, important work demonstrates that other demographic 
characteristics, like gender and race, are correlated with employee exit (see, e.g., Cho and Lewis 
2012; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011). As with most labor market contexts, the relative 
compensation of federal employees and the availability of outside options influences career 
choices (Bertelli 2007; Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Chen and Johnson 2015; Gamassou 2015; Lee 
and Whitford 2008). Exit also is associated with the ability of employees to voice opinions and 
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the loyalty they feel towards the organization (Lee and Whitford 2008). More generally, scholars 
hypothesize that some employees view their service in government as a noble cause and an 
important component of career decisions (Bright 2008; Perry and Wise 1990). Collectively, there 
is robust empirical evidence that these factors influence job satisfaction and overall satisfaction 
determines the likelihood of exit (see, e.g., Hahm, Jung and Youl Lee 2014; Kim and Fernandez 
2015; Lee and Jimenez 2011). 
In addition to individual factors related to exit, the context of public sector work 
influences employee exit. First, organizational factors, such as agency prestige, culture, and 
management practices enter into the individual’s decision to exit (Bertelli 2007; Gamassou 2015; 
Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011; Wilson 1994). Additionally, the networks in which the 
employee operates help in understanding conditions within the agency that alter exit intention 
(Moynihan and Pandey 2008; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 2011).  
 
3.2 Politics, Partisanship, and Turnover 
Only recently have scholars begun to focus on the role of politics in civil service turnover 
(Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Bolton et al. 2016; Cameron et al. 2015).2 An example from the Trump 
administration provides a useful illustration of why politics might enter in the decision to exit. In 
July of 2017, a member of the Senior Executive Service working in the Department of the 
Interior wrote an Op-ed in the Washington Post discussing his reassignment from evaluating 
policy regarding climate change and indigenous peoples in Alaska to collecting royalties for oil 
companies. Despite possessing no accounting experience, the Trump administration moved the 
employee because, as he viewed it, his policy positions on climate change were in conflict with 
                                                     
2 A recent meta-analysis of public sector turnover intention found 29 covariates associated with turnover; 
none were political (Hur 2017). 
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those of the Trump administration (Clement 2017). This employee (and the 50 others referenced 
in the Op-ed) can opt to either exit and not work in government during the Trump years or to 
“wait it out” and fight the administration.3  
Importantly, the existing work on the role of partisanship and turnover provides 
competing accounts of who exits and what different types of employees will do in response to 
political interference.4 First, numerous works suggest that policy disagreements between partisan 
agency personnel and the administration will increase turnover (Bertelli and Lewis 2013; 
Gailmard and Patty 2007; Richardson 2016). In this view, partisan civil servants have strong 
views about policy and a mismatch with the new presidential administration can decrease worker 
satisfaction, and thus lead to exit. 
Other work suggests a second set of civil servants who exit under certain political 
conditions. Cameron et al. (2015) use a formal model to highlight conditions under which civil 
servants with strong policy views on the left or the right are more likely to stay in government, 
while moderates leave. This is because policy-motivated bureaucrats who disagree with the 
president decide to stay in the agency to “wait out” the current administration in addition to 
ideologically congruent civil servants enthusiastic about enacting the president’s new policy 
agenda. Those in the middle of the ideological distribution will stay hoping they can make a 
                                                     
3 The Trump administration is not alone in making politicized staffing decisions. The Nixon administration 
used such a tactic when Fred Malek distributed the Federal Political Personnel Manual to pressure civil servants 
with protections to leave so the Nixon administration could gain control over a Democratic bureaucracy (Aberbach 
and Rockman 1976; Cole and Caputo 1979; U.S. Congress 1973). Other examples of this behavior include the 
targeted reassignment by Reagan’s first EPA administrator, Anne Gorsuch (Golden 2000), and other discrete actions 
of presidents influencing the civil service ranks through replacement in later presidencies (Aberbach and Rockman 
2000; Maranto 1993). The EPA struggled with recruitment and retaining top personnel following the Obama 
administrations use of czars (Steinzor 2012).  
4 Past works studying politics and the executive branch tend to focus on the ideology of an agency rather 
than partisanship (Clinton and Lewis 2008, Chen and Johnson 2015, Richardson, Clinton and Lewis 2015). Yet, 
assuming ideology is stable, the relationship between individual and agency ideology does not change over time. A 
conservative working in a liberal agency is always mismatched. Change occurs when political offices change 
between the parties, making partisanship the salient measure as it relates to exit. Moreover, scholars of public 
opinion note attitudes are oriented around partisanship and not ideology (Bartels 2000, Hetherington 2001, 
Hetherington 2009). For these reasons, partisanship serves as a useful measure to consider with the decision to exit. 
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difference and mitigate what they perceive to be the harmful choices of the new administration. 
However, when presidents enact extreme policy relative to the bureaucrat’s ideal policy and the 
expected value in the next period, moderates are most likely to depart because they have less to 
gain from waiting out the new administration and cannot temper extreme policy.5 Under these 
circumstances, partisans are the most likely to stay.  
 The conflicting predictions of past work underscore the methodological difficulties in 
studying exit from the permanent civil service. Surveys of federal employees often reveal a 
stated desire to depart but it is unclear how well responses to a survey correlate with actual 
behavior. Relying on survey questions about intent to exit could be problematic since responses 
to such questions can be expressive rather than truly reflective of likely career choices. For 
example, past work indicates teachers overstate their likelihood of exit (DeAngelis et al. 2013; 
Grissom et al. 2015) and a gap exists between stated intention to vote and actual turnout exists 
(Silver et al. 1986). Even with these potential pitfalls, Bertelli and Lewis (2013) estimate the 
relationship between policy disagreement between civil servants and appointees and intent to exit 
using data from the 2007 Survey on the Future of Government Service. They report a positive 
but imprecisely estimated relationship. Similarly, Richardson (2016) finds a correlation between 
the politicization of an agency and career employees’ survey indicated intent to exit.  
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) records allow scholars to observe actual exit, 
but reveal nothing regarding the individual political beliefs of civil servants. Bolton et al. (2016) 
                                                     
5 To provide more details regarding the Cameron et al. (2015) arguement, they argue presidents centralizing 
power disheartens many policy-motivated zealots who quit in protest. Two other types of employees stay. First, 
policy-motivated bureaucrats with significant disagreements with the current administration opt to “wait out” the 
current administration. The zealots adopting this strategy slack while the current administration is in office and wait 
for future gains when the administration changes. Second, moderate policy motivated bureaucrats are the most likely 
to exit when policy is centralized with the president and they feel they cannot “make a difference” by bringing 
extreme policy back towards the middle. If moderates do not feel like they can curb extreme policy by staying, they 
will exit. The middle exits when presidential administrations change and the new administration successfully moves 
policy to an opposing extreme. 
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examine exit rates of career civil servants following elections and use the ideological leanings of 
agencies as a proxy for individual ideology. Using complete records of employment provided by 
OPM spanning nearly three decades, they show that ideologically mismatched agencies (for 
example, EPA during Republican administrations) have higher rates of turnover when the 
presidency changes party. The relationship between exit and elections is strongest for those at the 
top of the agency, such as the Senior Executive Service. Careerists with lower rank in the agency 
exit less, presumably because they will be promoted to fill the positions vacated by those in the 
upper echelons of the agency. Yet this work attributes ideology to the agency, not the individuals 
who ultimately exit. The evidence from these works is an important step in demonstrating the 
relationship between exit rates and politics for the permanent civil service; however, data 
limitations make it difficult to parse accurately the effect of partisanship and politics on turnover.  
 
3.3 Data 
This paper resolves past data shortcomings by combining data from a survey of federal 
career executives in 2007 with OPM personnel records from 2007 to 2015. This allows for an 
examination of the relationship between individual partisan attachments and actual departures 
over the course of an administration, resolving methodological difficulties in past work. To 
begin, the 2007 Survey on the Future of Government Service (SFGS) asked top federal 
employees a wide array of questions regarding their views and backgrounds. From a sample of 
6,321 career civil servants, 1,770 responded. Notably, the survey asked respondents, “How likely 
is it that you will leave your agency in the next 12 months?” and provided the choices of “Very 
likely” (10.8%), “Somewhat likely” (15.8%), “Somewhat unlikely”(17.0%), “Very unlikely” 
(53.4%), and “Not sure” (3.0%) for their responses.  
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To observe actual exit, I tracked each respondent’s career through OPM personnel data 
provided by federalpay.org. This website includes annual personnel data from the Enterprise 
Human Resource Integration (EHRI) system managed by OPM.6 I matched this data with the 
names of survey respondents from the SFGS. I consider an employee to have departed when she 
is no longer included in the EHRI system (i.e., she is no longer in the database and ceases to 
draw a salary from the federal government).7 For the 1,040 careerist survey respondents matched 
to OPM data, 543 exit between 2007 to 2015. 
Table 1 displays the results of a cross-tabulation between stated exit intention and actual 
exit.  The values appearing in the table are the percentage of the people providing the particular 
response (e.g., “Very likely”) that had left government one, two or three years after taking the 
survey (i.e., FY 2008, FY 2009, FY 2010). The striking feature of this table is how few of those 
expressing a desire to leave actually quit. Of those reporting that they are “Very likely” to leave 
government in the next 12 months, only half do so within that year. One in five who are 
“Somewhat likely” to exit in 12 months actually exit. Three years after the survey, nearly a third 
of those that say they are very likely to exit in 12 months remain in government. This is initial 
evidence that stated exit may be unreliable. Yet the difference is only substantively important if 
the estimates produced provide competing predictions (which will be attended to in the results 
section).  
                                                     
6 To see the actual salary of the employee, that individual must make over $100,000 or be in the top 10% in pay for 
the agency. Given the construction of the SFGS, nearly all member of the sample fall in this category. Individuals 
working in sensitive positions, such as the military, federal police or nuclear science are not publicly disclosed and 
are not available. From federalpay.org: “Under open government laws specified in 5 U.S.C. § 552, the names, titles, 
and salaries of all civilian government employees are considered public information. However, employee 
demographics such as race and sex, and information on employee performance or disciplinary actions, are not 
publicly available. Data withheld under exceptions to these laws includes the identity and location of employees in 
sensitive occupations and security agencies (FBI, Secret Service, DEA, ATFE, the Internal Revenue Service, and the 
U.S. Mint), which are restricted for national security reasons.” In this paper redacted salaries were dropped. For 
more details see: https://www.federalpay.org/article/employee-lookup. 
7 The survey entered the field in fiscal year 2007. Some individuals drew no salary in 2008. Others drew 
their last salary in fiscal year 2008. Those that departed in either fashion were counted as exiting by 2008. 
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Table 3.1: Careerist Turnover Intention Compared to Actual Turnover 
 % Exit FY2008 % Exit FY2009 % Exit FY2010 
Very likely 
(10.8%) 
50.0 60.0 68.5 
Somewhat likely 
(15.8%) 
21.5 39.8 51.8 
Not sure 
(3.0%) 
2.7 10.8 21.6 
Somewhat unlikely 
(17.0%) 
2.4 10.7 21.4 
Very unlikely 
(53.4%) 
 
2.9 7.9 15.7 
 
3.4 Who Exits? Adjudicating between Competing Predictions 
Partisan misalignment between civil servants and the administration might influence the 
decision to exit. To measure partisanship, the SFGS asked survey respondents if their political 
party was, “Republican”, “Democrat”, “Independent”, “Other” or “Don’t Know.” 8 A follow-up 
question asked those who failed to pick one of the two major parties if they leaned towards one 
of those parties. I created two indicator variables to designate if the respondent is a Republican 
(0, 1; 23.6%) or Democrat (0, 1; 62.6%). Leaners were classified as being part of the party they 
leaned towards, consistent with past work (Keith et al. 1992).9 The remaining respondents have 
no partisan attachment and will be referred to as independents.10  
                                                     
8 Partisanship presents the best measure for the type of political factors that enter the decision to exit as it 
provides a clear signal of policy agreement or disagreement between political actors and civil servants. Models 
including ideology are not displayed, but those models reveal no relationship between individual ideology and the 
decision to exit. The upcoming results for partisanship are robust to the inclusion of individual ideology from survey 
responses and individual ideal point estimates.  
9 The results presented are robust to using a five-point partisan scale and displayed in Appendix I. Results 
show no meaningful statistical difference between leaners and independents, but the sign for estimates of leaners is 
negative.   
10 The prediction by Cameron et al. (2015) centers around a discussion of policy implementation. While policy and 
politics are undoubtedly correlated, it is important to still account for a policy dimension that perhaps is unrelated to 
partisanship. Clinton et al. 2012 estimate ideal points for each bureaucrat by scaling hypothetical roll call votes for 
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The data show independents exit more than partisans. From 2008 to 2014, 126 of 247 
(51.0%) Republicans and 342 of 664 (51.5%) Democrats exit. This contrasts with the 75 of 129 
(58.1%) of independents who exited. This is important initial evidence that partisanship appears 
to matter for turnover with partisans being most likely to stay. Democrats may be looking 
forward to working with a new Democratic administration and Republicans may be staying to 
fight or possibly wait out the new administration. Independents, perhaps, find the policy changes 
to be less to their liking and leave government. 
Most importantly, a closer look at the differences between intent to exit and actual exit 
reveals that partisans are more likely to say they will exit but not follow through. For them, a 
survey question potentially provides an opportunity to express dissatisfaction. Of those reporting 
in late 2007 that they are “Very likely” to leave in the next 12 months but do not exit two years 
later, close to 39% are Republican while only 3% are independents. Thus, a reliance on survey 
measures as a proxy for exit is potentially problematic when considering politics and may lead 
scholars to make incorrect inferences regarding the relationship between politics and exit.11  
 
3.5 Testing Traditional Explanations for Exit 
A number of individual and contextual factors help explain departure decisions. To 
account for these factors, the upcoming models include a number of controls. First, older 
employees might exit more frequently. An indicator, Retirement Age, controls for if the person is 
65 years old or older.12 In 2007, 8.5 percent of the sample was 65 or older. The mean changes as 
                                                                                                                                                                           
each respondent. Models including this measure do not alter substantive conclusions and the policy dimension is not 
statistically significant. 
11 Appendix H examines why some career executives say they will exit government but stay (i.e., 
difference between turnover intention and actual turnover). The two primary causes of the discrepancy are partisan 
attachments and persons that get raises after the survey period. 
12 The upcoming results are robust the inclusion of the respondents actual age as well as models estimated 
with the respondents age and squared age. Including a measure for years spent in government is positively 
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the sample ages and exits occur. The measure of age comes from a numerical value provided by 
respondents taking the SFGS in 2007 and is updated in each year when considered in the 
longitudinal models. Previous work has indicated a difference between the sexes and the rate of 
exit from the public sector. The inclusion of an indicator, Female (mean .279; s.d. .449), controls 
for differences in exit for men and women. Next, to account for compensation, I include the 
logged salary, ln(Salary) (mean 11.88;  s.d. .165), of each individual in the model.13 Scholars 
believe that an individual’s public service motivation can also influence their decision to stay or 
depart (Bright 2008, Perry 2010, Perry and Wise 1990, Perry, Hondeghem and Recascino Wise 
2010). The SFGS includes a battery of questions regarding why the individual entered 
government including pay and benefits as well as the desire to make a difference.14 Respondents 
entering for Pay and Benefits (mean 3.52; s.d. .988) ought to be more likely to leave while those 
wanting to Make a Difference (mean 4.23; s.d. .919) should be less likely to leave.  
Bolton et al. (2016) found turnover to increase in ideologically mismatched agencies with 
the president following elections. Given these careerists served during the Obama administration, 
conservative agencies ought to have increased turnover. I code each agency as a Liberal Agency 
(0, 1; 31.8%) or a Conservative Agency (0, 1; 30.6%) using estimates created by Clinton and 
Lewis (2008). Agencies are conservative or liberal if the 95% confidence interval surrounding 
                                                                                                                                                                           
associated with exit and does not alter the substantive conclusions reached regarding partisanship and exit. The 
indicator is displayed in the text for ease of interpretation for the reader. 
13 Another measure to consider is the bump in pay from one year to the next. To measure this I subtract the 
log of the employee’s salary in the current period from the log of the employee’s salary in the previous period. This 
measure is not included due to endogeneity concerns since factors related to exit might also be related to getting a 
raise. The same is true for annual bonuses. Moreover, during the Obama administration several years saw a bonus 
freeze on all bonuses not required by statute. The results are consistent regardless of specification. 
14 Survey respondents were asked, “Now thinking about your original decision to enter government service, 
how important were each of the following in your decision?” On a five point scale with the options “Very 
Important”, “Important”, “Moderately Important” “Not too Important”, and “Not Important at all” respondents 
received ten options to evaluate. The manuscript uses “Salary and benefits” and “Desire to make a difference” in the 
estimates. For entering for “Salary and benefits” 16.3% say “Very Important”, 36.5% say “Important”,  31.6% say 
“Moderately Important”, 13.3% say “Not too Important”, and 2.3% say  “Not Important at all”. For those entering 
with the “Desire to make a difference”, 49.3% say “Very Important”,  32.2% say “Important”,  13.2% say 
“Moderately Important”, 4.3% say “Not too Important”, and 1.0% say  “Not Important at all”. 
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the point estimate did not contain zero. The remaining agencies are considered moderate and are 
the reference category in models that follow. Finally, an increase in state unemployment suggests 
a lack of outside labor options that should decrease the likelihood of exit. As one might expect, 
most (77.4%) of the sample presides in the DC metro. I include the annual unemployment rate 
(State Unemployment; mean 7.33, s.d. 1.97) to account for changes in the outside labor market.15 
 
3.6 Methods  
To evaluate the impact of political factors on exit choices over an individual’s career, I 
estimate Cox proportional hazard models. Cox models predict failure, in this case departure from 
government, conditional on remaining in the sample and not leaving in an earlier period. 
Regression estimates produce hazard ratios of the estimated hazard relative to the baseline 
hazard. To ease interpretations, the paper reports the coefficients of the hazards. Positive values 
indicate an increased likelihood of exit (i.e., greater probability of departure in a given period, 
conditional on not having departed already) and negative coefficients indicate a decrease in the 
likelihood of departure. The models estimates hazards for 1,040 career civil servants with 
continuous observed service in government. The period begins in 2007, when the survey sample 
                                                     
15 Before turning to the models, it is worth noting what is omitted in the primary models. First, covariates that vary 
only by year, such as economic indicators and first year(s) of a new administration, lack variation due to the limited 
period considered. When included, the estimates are in the expected direction and do not change substantive 
interpretations of anything that follows, but the point estimate is simply an indicator for that year. Other aspects of 
that year beside the election would be captured in that estimate. As such, the coefficient cannot be stated as the 
“effect” of an election because all other factors that vary by year but are not measured are also captured in that 
estimate. Therefore, models with year indicators are not included in this analysis. Second, measures of agency 
independence are not included in the results that follow. Selin (2015) provides useful estimates for personnel 
insulation that particularly appear relevant. However, she estimates for a different office structure than the SFGS 
reports, making for roughly a third of the periods at risk to be excluded because they could not match to the correct 
office. Models estimated with the inclusion of the Selin measures that could match reveal it to be unrelated to exit 
and none of the substantive conclusions regarding other covariates changed. Yet, due to the substantial data loss and 
unknown nature of the missing estimates, the results of these models are not included. Models estimated with an 
indicator for being outside the cabinet departments reveal no relationship with agency independence and exit and do 
not alter the substantive conclusions for other variables of interests. Models estimated with indicators for the race of 
the respondent reveal it is not associated with exit for top career civil servants. 
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was constructed, and runs to 2015. During this time, 543 of the individuals exited government. 
The virtue of the Cox model is that it allows for a variety of different baseline hazard rates and it 
accounts for right censoring in the data for those still in government in 2015.16  
 
3.7 Results 
Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2 estimate hazard models using actual exit data. One quarter 
of the respondents exit by 2011; half exit by 2014.17 Across these model specifications, the Cox 
models reveal consistent directional patterns. The results consistently indicate that partisans are 
less likely to exit government during this period. The coefficient estimates are negative and 
precisely estimated across all models, or put another way, both Republicans and Democrats have 
lower hazard rates than independents. The hazard ratios allow for the comparison of the rate of 
exit for partisans to the baseline rate of exit. For partisans, hazard ratios of .76 for Republicans 
and .80 for Democrats suggest a 24 and 20 percent reduction in the rate of exit for Republicans 
and Democrats in a given year relative to independents.18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 Exit in 2015 cannot be considered even though data for that year exists because data in 2016 is needed to 
evaluate their exit in 2015. 
17 The models fit the data well. Diagnostic tests suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
hazards are proportional. The Schoenfeld residuals tests suggests all variables pass the proportionality assumption in 
the Cox model, failing to reject the null.   
18 Hazard ratios estimated by Model 3 in Table 2. The reduction is in reference to the baseline hazard rate. 
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Table 3.2: Estimates of Exit for Careerists, 2008 – 2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Actual Actual Actual Intent to Exit 
Partisan     
Republican -0.266* 
(0.137) 
-0.256* 
(0.136) 
-0.273** 
(0.135) 
0.049 
(0.120) 
     
Democrat -0.257** 
(0.119) 
-0.223* 
(0.118) 
-0.221* 
(0.119) 
0.001 
(0.106) 
Individual     
Retirement  Age  
 
0.398*** 
(0.0938) 
0.399*** 
(0.0938) 
0.682*** 
(0.120) 
     
Female   
 
-0.0926 
(0.0942) 
-0.0966 
(0.0944) 
-0.043 
(0.0816) 
     
Ln(Salary)   
 
0.484* 
(0.270) 
0.544** 
(0.273) 
0.490** 
(0.221) 
     
Make a Difference  
 
-0.0911** 
(0.0427) 
-0.0895** 
(0.0426) 
-0.051 
(0.0391) 
     
Salary and Benefits  
 
0.0882** 
(0.0433) 
0.0857** 
(0.0435) 
-0.047 
(0.0370) 
Contextual     
State Unemployment  
 
 
 
0.0194 
(0.0340) 
0.055 
(0.0387) 
     
Liberal Agency  
 
 
 
-0.166* 
(0.0998) 
-0.009 
(0.0893) 
     
Conservative Agency  
 
 
 
-0.200** 
(0.100) 
0.047 
(0.0882) 
     
Model 
Cases 
Observations 
Failures 
Cox 
6717 
1040 
543 
Cox 
6717 
1040 
543 
Cox 
6717 
1040 
543 
Ordered Probit 
 
1059 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individual in hazard 
models, robust standard errors in ordered probit the model. The ordered probit model used constant 
term and four cut points in the estimation but not displayed. The ordered probit has more cases 
because it includes cases that were later  
discontinuous. Order probit cut points at τ1=7.29, τ2=7.74, τ3=7.82, τ4=8.44 
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Additionally, and with respect to the magnitude of the coefficient above, Republicans and 
Democrats appear equally likely to depart government during the 2007 to 2015 period. A Wald 
test reveals the difference between the coefficients estimated for Republicans and Democrats to 
be statistically indistinguishable from one another (p<0.58 in Model 3). Moreover, holding 
partisanship constant, working in liberal agencies (e.g., Education, Labor) and conservative 
agencies (e.g., Commerce, Treasury) are both less likely to exit than individuals working in 
moderate agencies (e.g., Agriculture, Transportation).  Other past explanations of exit largely 
comport with expectations and receive attention in Appendix D.19  
Just as important, and perhaps the most striking feature of Table 2, is the difference 
between models using actual exit and Model 4, shaded in gray, which estimates an ordered probit 
model predicting whether respondents indicated one of the five response categories regarding the 
intent to exit government in the next 12 months. The conclusions drawn using this approach are 
markedly different. Unlike Models 1-3, the coefficients estimated for Model 4 suggest no 
relationship between partisanship and exit; if anything, partisans are more likely to exit. 
Moreover, several other explanations of exit fail to achieve statistical significance in Model 4. 
Thus, scholars relying on survey responses would draw very different and incorrect conclusions 
                                                     
 19 The models assume there are no conditional relationships between partisanship and other factor such as the 
ideology of the agency, age, or time. I estimated models with interaction terms for the partisanship of the individual 
and the ideological leaning of the agency. The substantive findings are unaltered. Table C1 in Appendix J displays 
the results of this estimation. Cameron et al. (2015) suggest a conditional relationship between partisanship and age. 
If individuals truly wait out administrations, then Democrats past retirement age during this period should be more 
likely to stay than Republicans to receive their payoffs from staying in government. To test this consideration, I 
estimated models with an indicator for being of the retirement age interacted with partisanship. Table C2 displays 
the results suggesting no conditional relationship between age, partisanship and exit. Republicans and Democrats of 
retirement age exit at rates similar to one another. This suggests that the longer time horizons that might incentivize 
those in the out-party to stay do not outweigh the decision to leave government (and presumably retire). Finally, the 
exclusion of the first year of exits (when the Bush administration still occupied the Oval Office) does not change the 
substantive conclusions. Estimates in Table C3 replicate specifications from Table 2, showing consistent results. The 
relationships are less precisely estimated due to fewer cases, but partisanship is still negatively signed for both 
Republicans and Democrats and of similar magnitudes. Moreover, many of the individual and contextual 
explanations that were statistically significant in Table 2 are statistically significant and signed in the same direction 
for Table C3. 
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regarding who left government from the sample. Taken collectively, the results suggest that 
moderate careerists exited government more frequently than partisans, consistent with one of the 
results predicted by Cameron et al. (2015), and suggests a potential for the middle to hollow out.  
 
3.8 Changing Partisan Distributions in the Management Corps 
The Cameron et al. (2015) model provides insights regarding the changing distribution of 
ideology within the management corps. Specifically, they found the continuing exit of moderates 
from government would result in only partisan zealots on either extreme remaining in 
government. Yet the overall distribution of ideology within federal agencies shifts not only in 
accordance with exit, but also based upon who replaces those that left. The next section 
considers various replacement strategies in conjunction with estimated partisan exit to display 
what the partisanship of the management corps might look like over the course of a two-term 
presidential administration. 
One way of evaluating the effects of partisanship on departures is to project what this 
would mean for the composition of a corps of managers over the course of a presidential term. 
For examples, consider the Senior Executive Service. Placed just under appointees, OPM states 
the SES, “are the major link between these appointees and the rest of the Federal workforce.”20 
As such, even subtle changes in the partisan distribution of exit have potentially important 
consequences to the federal government. 
To calculate the likely effect of exit on the partisan composition of the management 
corps, one must consider those that exit as well as the replacements. The first set of columns in 
Figure 1 includes estimates of the percentage change in the management corps by partisanship, 
                                                     
20 See https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/ for a full characterization of 
the SES. 
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assuming that replacements will be drawn in a random (i.e., merit-based) way from the existing 
distribution of careerists.21 Positive values represent gains in the share of the management team; 
negative values are the lost share of the management team. The first set of columns assumes 
replacement is a random draw from the partisan distribution of executives (i.e., a draw from the 
partisan distribution in the previous year, adjusted for accessions and separations). Under this 
assumption, we see 2.1 percent more partisans in the management corps after 8 years.22  The 
slightly more than 2 percent loss of independents might seem small, but they only comprise 13.8 
percent of the sample to begin the administration. Under these conditions, partisans would now 
occupy 15 percent of positions previously occupied by independents. 
 Interestingly, even though Republicans were in the minority, the number of Republicans 
increased because they were the least likely to leave. Perhaps this is to be viewed as a silver 
lining in the effort to prevent presidential overreach in the executive branch. When out-partisans 
are the least likely to exit, the turnover for other types of partisans prevents a skewing of the 
composition of agencies towards the party in power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
21 The average rate of departure for the sample in any given year is 11.5 percent. Democrats are 2.1% less 
likely to exit while Republicans are 2.8% less likely to exit in a given period. Estimates for the marginal change in 
exit for partisans come from probit estimates of exit with a time control for duration dependence. 
22 The percentage change subtracts the percentage of the management corps identifying as one type of 
partisan from the beginning of the administration from the distribution identifying at the end. When values are 
positive, this indicates that more of the type is present at the end of the administration than there was initially. 
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Figure 3.1: Change in Partisan Share of the Civil Service, Due 
to Exit over a Two-Term Admin 
 
Note: Percent change calculated through iterative process described in text above. The values of the bars represent 
the difference between the percentages of a particular category of partisan at the end of the two terms less the 
percentage of the category of partisan at the beginning of the two terms. Leadership Directories list just over 6,000 
positions in the SES. 
 
What if promotions favor partisans? Replacement favoring one party over the other shifts 
the distribution of partisanship quite differently. The second set of columns in Figure 1 assume 
that an administration can pick co-partisans to replace those who exit. Specifically, the 
assumption here is that a Democrat administration promotes 5 percent more Democrats and 5 
percent fewer Republicans. Such an assumption amounts to every twentieth pick being a 
Democrat promoted over a Republican. Under these assumptions, the changes in partisanship 
results in significant gains for the Democrats while Republicans and Independents suffer losses. 
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By construction, the losses for independents are nearly the same as the random draw from the 
sample. However, Republicans now suffer losses due to politicized replacement because the 
favoritism is greater than the gap in exit rates between Republicans and Democrats.  
These results have two key implications. First, so long as independents have the highest 
rate of exit from government, their share of the partisan distribution will decrease  
(unless for some reason they are overrepresented in the replacements). Second, subtle partisan 
promotion patterns in conjunction with partisan exit rates can move the composition of the civil 
service even within one administration. Future work should examine partisan promotion patterns 
and how that changes the partisan composition of the federal workforce. 
 
3.9 Early Discussion of the Trump Administration 
 The Trump administration needs to play out to conduct a similar analysis for Obama 
administration employees. Yet some work on this subject matter suggests a different pattern of 
exit. Doherty et al. (2018) examines exits from the Senior Executive Service from 2014 through 
the first six months of the Trump administration. They find little difference in partisan exits prior 
to the election of Donald Trump, but then see a significant difference between Republicans and 
Democrats following his election. Both Democrats and liberal members of the SES were more 
likely to exit following the election. 
 While this result is different than Bush era employees during the Obama administration, 
it is not inconsistent with theoretical predictions by Cameron et al. (2015) and other empirical 
results. When the politics of the new administration are very different from the views of the civil 
servant, some civil servants will opt to leave government rather than carry out the policy 
directives of the new administration. Perhaps the contrasting results speak to the relationships 
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that each administration has with the permanent civil service. Future work should evaluate this 
turnover of career civil servants during different presidential administrations to see what patterns 
emerge under different presidencies. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 Since the advent of the civil service system, voters and their elected officials have given 
greater deference to the administrative state to ensure welfare-enhancing outcomes from 
government. Retaining qualified and experienced personnel to make reasoned, rather than 
partisan, judgments is a necessary component of a professional bureaucracy in the United States. 
The systematic loss of particular employees due to changes in political power has the potential to 
remove a moderating opinion from agency deliberations as well as set up hostile dynamics 
between agencies and new administrations.  
This paper provided evidence that turnover of top careerists in the United States varies in 
accordance with the political beliefs of the individual civil servant. First, what civil servants 
report on surveys in “intent to exit” questions is different from actual exit. Partisans may 
overstate their exit intention and this can lead to materially different conclusions regarding 
partisanship and its relationship with exit. Estimates of exit across the Bush, Obama, and Trump 
administrations suggests partisanship plays a role in the exit decision of top career civil servants. 
In addition, Bush administration federal executives working in moderate agencies are more 
likely to leave than their colleagues who work in more political agencies on the left or the right 
holding all else constant.   
The results highlight the possibility of a moving partisan distribution amongst federal 
civil servants. If independents are exiting government at the highest rate, then agencies are being 
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increasingly populated with partisans. If presidents are using strategic promotion decisions, this 
will only serve to accelerate the partisan polarization of federal agencies. Demonstrating this 
behavior for multiple presidencies will help in the understanding of agency dynamics across 
administrations and overall trends of the federal work force.  
Political turnover could have profound consequences for government. These civil 
servants occupy positions at the top of the federal hierarchy. Losing these individuals is costly to 
the federal government and normatively troubling. The agencies where those losses occur 
acutely feel the consequences of the departure because they lose someone with a title like 
“Director” or “Deputy Assistant Secretary” who was tasked with important functions within the 
agency. When these positions lose experienced careerists, agencies and their constituents suffer. 
Furthermore, in a time of crisis, a new Trump administration lacking a subject matter expert to 
help resolve the problem might result in a decline in general welfare. Understanding these 
varying partisan exit rates could have profound consequences for agency outputs in the United 
States.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
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Politics and the Tenure of U.S. Political Appointees, 1977-2014 
Agencies carry out the vast majority of modern governmental functions. Unelected 
officials tasked with these important functions generate policy based off expertise to ensure 
competent governance. As such, elected officials supervise the outcomes and processes 
generating policy to hold the unelected officials accountable to the public. This oversight by 
elected officials is a central pillar of democratic accountability for agencies, ensuring political 
actors have some control over agency decision-making. Yet the nature of that oversight changes 
as elections shift political control of the different branches of government or the number of 
principals overseeing an agency increases or decreases. When these changes occur, who now 
controls the administrative state is not clear. On one hand, multiple voices could soak up 
discretion and restrict agency action. On the other, competing voices might lead to opportunities 
to pick policy from a wider menu of options and provide cover to disagree with one of the 
political principals. 
The changing exit rates from government of federal employees constitutes an observable 
implication to the nature of bureaucratic control. Individuals exit their place of employment more 
frequently when they lose control over decisions in their work environment. As such, the 
relationship between turnover and bureaucratic control should reveal changes in effectiveness for 
political oversight. By looking at turnover of appointees, it is possible to consider how different 
political controls alter the autonomy of the agency and in turn shed light on who controls agency 
actions. 
The paper proceeds with the following sections. First, it briefly reviews the literature on 
bureaucratic controls and agency turnover, linking the two through agency autonomy. Next, it 
describes different political appointees and how each my respond differently to different forms 
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of bureaucratic controls. The paper then describes the data and presents results on the nature of 
bureaucratic control and appointee tenure, finding divided government extends appointee tenure 
while additional congressional oversight committees provides conflicting results. The paper 
concludes by discussing the findings and the implications they have for bureaucratic control. 
4.1 Bureaucratic Control and Turnover 
As Hammond and Knott (1996) note, there exists conflicting accounts of who controls 
the bureaucracy. Citing past work, they characterize this congressional control as a reduction of 
autonomy and perhaps “agency subservience” in the way Congress controls agencies. Yet 
Hammond and Knott (1996) also note through other past works ways in which presidents exert 
control on agency action, one of which is the selection of appointees to direct the agency. Critical 
to either framing, the exercise of control by the president or Congress results in the reduced 
autonomy of agencies. 
It is hard to conceive of an action from an agency with executive appointees and 
congressional appropriations that lack the potential for political control. Yet this multifaceted 
control rarely pits political branches in direct conflict with one another. Rather, these conflicts 
take of form of sequential interactions political overseers have with agencies. For example, 
Congress passes legislation authorizing agencies to act. Yet presidents can alter the intent of the 
legislation through signing statements and other executive directions either directly from the 
president or through the president’s appointees. Congress can then revise the legislation to curb 
any unwanted action through executive direction. Given this arrangement, it is not clear power 
lies with the branch granting broad authority or the branch implementing the policy. In another 
example, Congress possesses the power of the purse. Yet, unless specific language by Congress 
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binds the agency’s discretion with the funds, administrators within the agency, potentially 
overseen by appointees put in place by the president, have discretion over how the money is 
spent. In this instance, the agency and the executive branch acts second to any congressional 
authorization or appropriation, but ultimately decides how the money is spent. It is debatable 
which branch has the upper hand in this situation. These sequential and endogenous decisions 
make identifying who controls agency actions a difficult question for scholars to address. 
Scholars have wrestled with these power dynamics. For example, two competing 
explanations exist for how multiple principals alter the influence of Congress over agencies. 
Some argue overlapping jurisdictions increases the influence of Congress (Aberbach 1990; 
Bendor 1985; King 1997; O’Connell 2006) while others argue it decreases influence (Clinton et 
al. 2015; Gailmard 2009; Hammond and Knott 1996, 1999; Weingast and Moran 1983). How 
each reach their conclusion strays away from the topic of this paper. However, turnover provides 
an interesting test of these competing predictions. Multiple principals either make agency life 
stressful and chaotic or liberating and empowering. The realization of which type of agency life 
should clearly manifest in the length of the tenure of civil servants. 
Even when scholars hone in on one type of oversight, the results are mixed. The 
congressional oversight structure in the United States does not uniformly transcend agencies. 
Rather, layers of oversight, typically in the form of committees, observe similar agency actions 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Dodd and Schott 1979; Evans 1999; King 1997; Seidman 1998), 
so much so that at least four committees oversee every agency (Baumgartner, Jones and 
MacLeod 2000). And scholars have shown the proliferation of committees has benefited 
members electorally, but at the expense of Congress being able to respond to executive action 
(Clinton et al. 2014). Such an institutional arrangement creates an environment where civil 
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servants may have multiple signals to interpret, with the consequences of having the multiple 
signals being unclear. 
The structure of bureaucratic oversight creates multiple principals to oversee agency 
action. These differences have consequences for bureaucratic outcomes (McCarty 2005). While 
committees overseeing agency action might be nuanced, perhaps the starkest differences between 
ideal policy for the executive and legislature emerge during times of divided government. In 
times of divided government, presidential policy input likely differs from that of oversight 
committees because the party controlling the committee is different than the party controlling the 
presidency. Past work has indicated that political actors struggle to influence agency action when 
there is disagreement with what the actors want the agency to do (Bawn 1995; Dahl and 
Lindblom 1953; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; King 1997; Whitford 2005; Wood and Waterman 
1993). As unified and divided government change, so too does the ability of each branch to 
control agency action. Agencies may listen to a singular voice in the executive (Moe 1985, 1987) 
or seek shelter from those in Congress who share the preferences of the agency (Hammond and 
Knott 1996; Wilson 1989). Observing appointee tenure varying systematically with these 
changes in institutional arrangements would provide insight in the nature of agency autonomy 
and bureaucratic control. 
Past work suggests the loss of autonomy leads to greater exit from government. 
Employees leave government with they lose the ability to voice opinions (Lee and Whitford 
2008). Organizational factors, such as agency prestige, culture, and management practices enter 
into the individual’s decision to exit (Bertelli 2007; Gamassou 2015; Pitts, Marvel and Fernandez 
2011; Wilson 1994). Collectively, there is robust empirical evidence that these factors influence 
job satisfaction. That satisfaction determines the likelihood of exit (Hahm, Jung and Youl Lee 
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2014; Kim and Fernandez 2015; Lee and Jimenez 2011). So, when oversight binds the hands of 
an agency and makes an unpleasant work environment, employees should be more likely to 
leave. Or, when granted additional autonomy in decision-making, employees should be more 
likely to stay. 
4.2 Variety of Appointees 
Many scholars contribute to our understanding of the consequences of appointee turnover 
(Boyne, et al. 2010; Dull and Roberts 2009; Dull, Roberts and Keeney 2012; Hahm, Jung and 
Youl Lee 2014; Lewis and Waterman 2013; Wood and Marchbanks 2008). These works provide 
critical insight into why political appointees matter to government. However, gradations exists 
within the appointee ranks. With different career paths and protections from political actors, 
these different appointees assist in the execution of policy. To understand more generally the role 
of politics and oversight as it relates to exit decisions of civil servants, it is necessary to consider 
the nuance in types of political appointees. 
This paper considers three different types of appointees: employees on the Executive 
Schedule (EX pay band), Schedule C employees, and appointed members of the Senior 
Executive Service (SES). To begin, political appointees serve the president and leave not only 
when the civil servant desires to exit, but also if the president deems it time to move on from a 
particular appointee. Yet even amongst appointees, clear distinctions exist. The most prominent 
political appointees (e.g., cabinet secretaries and others in senior management positions) go 
through a confirmation process in the Senate. Once nominated, the Senate goes through a vetting 
process to affirm the individual in question possesses the requisite skills to fill the office. As 
such, by statute, they are compensated more than careerists working within the agency and in 
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some cases their pay is codified by statute specifically stating the positions on the Executive 
Schedule. 
While some appointees go through rigorous confirmation hearings, others do not face 
such scrutiny. One example are Schedule C employees. These employees serve the president as 
confidential assistants, policy experts, special councils and schedulers (Moore 2017; NYT 
2016).1 In addition to political appointees and Schedule C employees, the president has 
appointment authority with up to ten percent of the Senior Executive Service (SES). Created 
during the Carter administration, the SES reorganized the top of the hierarchy for careerists, 
creating a class of civil servant above the General Schedule. These civil servants represent a 
professional class of elite administrators that provide a conduit between appointees and others in 
the agency. The different appointment authorities and procedures by which each type enters 
office enables tests for if varying degrees of appointee autonomy through the institutional 
arrangements each face.2 The next sections operationalize those differences and evaluate the exit 
decisions for each of the different actors. 
1 Typically these positions are for a specific policy domain that requires particular attention. Also, Lee Atwater 
possessed strong convictions about rewarding young campaign staffers with Schedule C positions (Wheaton, 2016). 
Within the federal hierarchy, Schedule C employees are the lowest level of political appointment. The immediate 
supervisor to these employees needs to be a presidential appointee, a member of the Senior Executive Service, or 
another Schedule C employee (OPM, 2018). That said most of the time Schedule C employees still occupy the top 
pay bands in the General Schedule. Sometimes these appointees convert to career civil servants. This conversion, 
sometimes referred to as “burrowing”, is not without controversy. For example, in 2008 Congress found 
“burrowing” the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security improperly allowed political 
appointees to convert to career positions (Schwemle, 2012). Additionally, in 1992 the GAO criticized the practice of 
placing newly hired Schedule C employees immediately in positions within the Executive Office of the President, 
which ultimately led to the end of this practice (Ungar, 1992). 
2 Civil servants work with a variety of protections against political removal. At one extreme, political appointees 
serve the president and can be terminated at the discretion of the president. Legal safeguards provide some 
protection for appointees from the president. For example, fixed terms help insulate agency heads from the 
president. Notably, Selin (2015) provides the greatest degree of nuance to this debate, providing a Bayesian latent 
variable model across 50 different structural features. Selin (2015) adds to the literature on political insulation by 
considering the range of protections afforded to agencies. Yet this insulation results in agency level protections that 
shields individuals. Considering different types of employees contributes to the understanding of insulation and 
resultant turnover of federal employees.   
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4.3 Data 
Employment records are necessary to evaluate the tenure of federal employees. The Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) keeps such records. Through a Freedom of Information Act 
request, Buzzfeed News obtained employment histories of all federal employees from 1973 to 
the first quarter of 2017. OPM categorizes employees with unique markers to indicate the 
different types of federal employees mentioned previously.3 Table 1 displays descriptive 
information about the tenure of the different federal employees. 
Several interesting facts emerge in Table 1. First, the panel contains the career history of 
anyone who worked on the Executive Schedule, received a Schedule C appointment or served as 
a member of the SES in a Noncareer capacity. All told, this encompasses 25,975 employees who 
provided 72,468 years of service in some appointed capacity. For all three appointee types, most 
serve less than three years in their position. Yet some serve much longer. The granular nature of 
these data allow for the identification of each of the longest serving appointees. The longest 
tenured individual on the Executive Schedule served on the Railroad Retirement Board, 
Schedule C in the Security and Exchange Commission, and Noncareer SES on the Barry 
Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation. 
3 All employees on the EX pay band are considered political appointees. While this is not the universe of 
political appointees, EX employees represent the highest pay for political appointees. A unique numerical value for 
the appointment type for Schedule C (44) and Noncaeer SES (55). For Appendix N, appointment type identifies 
Career SES (50). OPM began reporting ALJs with their own pay play (AL) in 1991.    
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Table 1: Length of Tenure Description for 
Political Appointees, 1977-2014 
EX Pay Schedule C Noncareer 
SES 
Number of 
employees 
4,278 14,673 7,024 
Number of 
quarter-persons 
61,129 151,620 77,123 
Number of exits 3,893 13,453 6,430 
Median length of 
tenure 
11 Quarters 8 Quarters 9 Quarters 
Mean length of 
tenure 
13.1 
Quarters 
9.7 Quarters 10.3 Quarters 
Year First 
Observed  
1977 1982 1979 
Longest Tenure 88 Quarters 97 Quarters 88 Quarters 
OPM records contain a unique numerical identifier for each individual in the data. By 
selecting upon the unique identifier for the type of employee in each quarter, then appending 
those records, a panel can be created with the unique identifier distinguishing each civil servant 
through time.4 When civil servants cease to draw a salary in that pay band they no longer appear 
in the panel. Figure 1 shows when these exits occur for each type of federal employee. 
Figure 1 displays several useful trends. First, clear spikes in turnover occur following the 
election of a new president. It is not surprising that appointees who served the previous 
administration leave. Second, trends in appointee exits roughly mirror one another, which 
perhaps suggests differentiating appointees by type is a distinction without a difference.  Figure 1 
only shows the number of exits from the employee type, not the rate at which that type of 
4 While data exist through 2017, a data breach ended the unique numerical identifier after the second 
quarter of 2014 and is why it is the last date considered in this analysis. 
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employee exits.  Figure 2 considers the relative rate of exit for each employee. From Figure 2, it 
is clear that the rate of exit by a particular type of appointee seems to vary closely with one 
another. Yet these observations do not control for any factors leading up to the decision for these 
employees to exit government. The rest of the paper addresses this concern. 
Figure 4.1 Number of Appointee Exits by Year 
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Figure 4.2 Percent of Appointees Departing by Year 
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4.4 Hypotheses 
This paper considers if turnover is associated with two institutional arrangements. First, 
the institutional arrangement of requiring some political appointees to be confirmed by the 
Senate creates a distinct prediction. When the Senate is controlled by the opposition party, 
agencies receive signals from multiple principals with potentially competing messages. As such 
it could lead to increased agency autonomy and a decline in turnover. Moreover, those 
appointees that require confirmation from the Senate ought to stay in government longer. The 
reason for this is that replacing these individuals becomes more difficult and in turn enhances the 
stature within the executive branch of the current appointee. If this is an accurate 
characterization, individuals on the Executive Schedule should see the greatest decrease in 
departure rate. An indicator for if the opposition party controls the Senate accounts for this in the 
upcoming model.5  
Second, past works evaluating the number of oversight committees from Congress and its 
relationship with the bureaucracy produce conflicting accounts, suggesting more oversight 
committees can enhance agency autonomy (Gailmard 2009; Hammond and Knott 1996, 1999) or 
limit agency discretion (Aberbach 1990; Bendor 1985; King 1997; O’Connell 2006). Accounting 
for the oversight structure should adjudicate between these differences and how it alters the work 
environment of federal employees. 
Past works considering exit suggest poor agency jobs satisfaction, culture and prestige 
can exacerbate turnover (Bright 2008; Lee and Whitford 2008; Gamassou 2015; Hahm, Jung and 
Youl Lee 2014; Kim and Fernandez 2015; Lee and Jimenez 2011; Perry and Wise 1990; Pitts, 
Marvel and Fernandez 2011; Wilson 1994). A natural implication of how oversight alters agency 
5 Across all three types of appointees, just over 49 percent of the observations have the opposite party 
controlling the Senate. 
76 
life is how long employees work for the agency under differing levels of oversight. Shorter 
tenures for agencies with more committees overseeing the agency suggests many oversight 
committees detract from agency life while longer tenures suggest an enhanced workplace 
experience through greater autonomy. The Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies 
(Lewis and Selin 2012) provides information about the characteristics of the agency, namely the 
number statutorily required oversight committees.6 
4.5 Controls 
Civil servants leave government for many other reasons beyond politics. Like other employees 
across the private sector, as civil servants age they are more likely to leave. Federal records 
report the age of the civil servant in each quarter. This control is included in the upcoming model 
as well as a squared term.7 Table B1 in Appendix B reports the descriptive statistics for age and 
each subsequent upcoming control by appointee type. 
Pay is also associated with exit. Typically those that are paid more are more likely to stay 
in their job (Bertelli 2007). Federal employment records report the base pay of each civil servant 
in each quarter. Upcoming models include the pay of federal employees adjusted to 2016 dollars. 
Additionally, outside opportunities may shape the employees desire to stay in the federal 
government. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data of quarterly unemployment. The 
unemployment rate in the quarter proxies for outside employment opportunity. When the 
unemployment rate is high, civil servants’ lack of outside opportunity might lead to them being 
6 Committees formed outside statutory authorization, which matters for behavior of legislators (see 
Bamugartner et al. (2003), are not considered in this count. For the cases in the data, the mean number of 
committees for an individual is 3.36, s.d. 3.33. 
7 OPM reports age in 5 year intervals. Each interval reported was coded to be the highest value in that 
category. A squared term is used to shape the relationship with age if it is the case that people are most likely to 
leave early in their life (the job is not right for them) or well in to their careers (they are approaching retirement age). 
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more likely to stay in their current job. The national unemployment rate in the given quarter 
appears in the upcoming models to account for this explanation.  
The president’s standing vis-à-vis the public has the potential to shape the workforce in 
the executive branch. Popular presidents have political capital and seek to enact their agendas. 
That suggests positive agency action and a more enjoyable workplace for civil servants. This 
contrasts with an unpopular president, who more likely has to act through agency action (rather 
than congressional action) and in turn can create a contentious relationship between the president 
and the people working for agencies. The presidential approval at the end of each quarter is 
included in the upcoming estimates to account for this consideration. 
Several other institutional arrangements about the agency might alter the tenure of civil 
servants. Independent agencies might also be different than departments within the cabinet. An 
indicator differentiates these agencies from cabinet positions.8 Finally, employees working in 
ideological agencies might also have different tenures. Using the Clinton and Lewis 2008 
ideology estimates for agencies, indicators of if the agency is considered conservative or liberal 
are included.9 
4.6 Results 
A probit model with indicators for duration dependence estimates the departure of each 
appointee from government. For the upcoming estimates, each type of appointee has its own 
panel in the estimates are for only that type of appointee. For example, the Schedule C panel 
only considers the tenure of individuals while they were drawing salaries as Schedule C 
8 The upcoming results are robust to the estimations considering only commissions to be independent. 
9 Because the size of the confidence intervals vary around the agency ideology estimates, I opt not to use 
the rank order of the ideal point estimates but rather the ideal point suggests the agency is conservative or liberal. 
The agency is considered liberal or conservative if the agency ideology confidence interval does not contain zero.  
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employees. As such, their exit is when they no longer are a Schedule C employee. Leaving the 
panel does not necessarily mean the individual left government. Despite being at the top of the 
federal hierarchy, some employees leave a particular employment category to enter another 
within government. While they are exiting the panel and no longer part of that employment 
category, their reasons for leaving are quite different than exiting government and all the 
theoretical predictions previously discussed. The concern of the paper is those leaving 
government, so it excludes cases of moving within the federal government across pay 
categorization. Appendix A discusses this consideration in greater detail. 
 The upcoming probit models include indicators for each quarter to control for duration 
dependence. So, if a given observation were to be the second time the individual appears in the 
panel, the indicator for period two would take a value of one while all other indicators take a 
value of zero. Fixed effects control for which year in the presidential administration (i.e., year 
one, year two, etc.) as well as which administration (Carter, Reagan, etc.) to account for 
difference in where in an administration the exit occurred as well as differences in presidents. 
Table 2 displays the results for the departure estimates for the three different appointee types. 
Variables included in the estimation but not the table appear in the note. 
Several interesting results emerge from the estimates in Table 2. One institutional 
arrangement, if the Senate is of the opposition party, does consistently alter the tenure of several 
types of federal employees. All Appointees are more likely to stay in government when the 
opposition party controls the Senate. Next, the number of committees overseeing an agency only 
alters the associated change in departure rate for members of the Senior Executive Service, 
making them more likely to exit. The result suggests that the oversight structure of increased 
committees adversely alters the tenure of these employees. 
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Two other agency specific characteristics results merit attention. First, independent agencies see 
less turnover. While coarse, an indicator of agency independence denotes a clear step away from 
presidential control and influence designed specifically to insulate the agency.10 It seems like that 
has extended tenures for appointees as even the results that do not achieve statistical significance 
have the correct sign. That said only those appointees requiring confirmation by the senate see a 
decreased departure rate that is statistically different from zero. 
                                                     
10 The results are robust to considering independent commissions, not just if the agency is independent 
from the cabinet.  
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Table 4.2: Probit Estimates for Government Exit for 
Federal Appointees, 1977-2014 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 EX Pay Schedule C Noncareer 
SES 
    
Opposition Senate -0.078* 
(0.0394) 
 
-0.081*** 
(0.022) 
-0.107** 
(0.036) 
Number of 
Committees 
 
0.0051 
(0.0039) 
-0.0024 
(0.0019) 
0.0079** 
(0.0027) 
Independent Agency -0.259*** 
(0.024) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
 
Liberal Agency 0.071* 
(0.028) 
0.084*** 
(0.016) 
0.066** 
(0.023) 
    
Conservative Agency 0.080** 
(0.025) 
0.0627*** 
(0.016) 
0.075*** 
(0.021) 
    
Unemployment 0.157*** 
(0.013) 
0.185*** 
(0.008) 
0.204*** 
(0.012) 
    
Administration FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Term-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Duration Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Individuals Traits Yes Yes Yes 
    
Person Quarters 
Persons 
41,257 
3,362 
108,034 
12,407 
55,689 
5,941 
         Standard errors in parentheses 
              * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
         Note: Models estimated with a constant, excluding individuals who left the pay  
         band but did not leave government as well. Models estimate the departure from  
         the federal government. Quarterly presidential approval is included in the model. 
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Second, ideological agencies see greater turnover during this period. This relationship is 
not conditional upon who occupies the Oval Office. Models estimating interaction terms between 
the president and the ideologically different agency do not show any magnified rates of departure 
for appointees in mismatched agencies.11 How this relates to careerists is another consideration 
for future work. 
Thus far the discussion of the results simply notes the sign of the estimate and if it is 
statistically distinguishable from zero. Most importantly, it is necessary to consider just how 
much the estimates expedite departure from the federal government. Figure 3 considers the 
marginal rate of exit for different types of federal employees for political and institutional 
arrangements for one session of Congress. Figure 3 provides some context as to just how many 
more federal employees leave when circumstances change. For example, if the opposition party 
controls the Senate for two years, the marginal decline in exit is just over 9 percent for Noncareer 
members of the SES. Recall from Figure 2, the naïve exit rate for these employees is roughly 10 
percent. So, a 9 percent increase in departure over two years constitutes a 45 percent increase in 
departures during a congressional session.  
 
                                                     
11 Given that the appointees were either placed in the mismatched agency by the president, or the president 
allowed the previous appointee to stay on through the new administration, it seems plausible that the turnover rates 
of appointees should remain insensitive to the ideological congruency of the agency (not the appointee) and the 
president. Also, if appointees exit preemptively in anticipation of an administration change, these result would 
emerge. 
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Note: Point estimates generated by calculating marginal change in the 
probability of exit then multiplying the marginal change by 8 to note 
differences across a two-year period. For continuous measures, the 
estimate was also multiplied by a one standard deviation change to 
provide a more plausible change in the probability of exit. 
 
 
 
4.7 Discussion 
The results present have several relevant implications towards broader American politics. 
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First, more Congressional oversight committees are associated with greater turnover in the SES. 
Perhaps oversight committees are efficiently allocated to cover the complex policy domains 
some agencies work in and the resulting turnover is just a consequence of the policy a particular 
agency handles. However, if too many committees oversee a particular agency, a consequence of 
that arrangement is increased departure from the SES. Losing employees from the SES, even if 
they are appointed, costs agencies in terms of the ability to communicate with the president that 
may in turn lead to conflict with the agency. 
 The nuanced result for the relationship between the number of oversight committees and 
exit is indicative of the conflicting accounts in the literature. It makes sense that oversight actions 
from Congress alter the work of different civil servants in different ways. The result in this paper 
demonstrates the consequence of such oversight through increased turnover in the SES. In 
interpreting this result, one should not conclude that a reorganization is necessary to trim the 
number of committees overseeing agencies because these results cannot judge what the optimal 
number of committees overseeing a particular agency ought to be. To assess the optimal amount 
of oversight by Congress requires additional studies.   
 Perhaps past conflicting accounts of congressional oversight stem from the heterogeneity 
of employees the oversight affects. The composition of the federal workforce is not constant 
across all agencies. As such, there very well could be a variety of responses from agencies to the 
same oversight structure depending upon the composition of the employees working in the 
agency. Accounting for the people the oversight affects, in addition to the structural features that 
characterize the agency, better assesses the role oversight plays in controlling the actions of 
federal agencies. 
 The opposition party controlling the Senate decreases the rate of exit for top federal 
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employees. This is true of all three types of appointees. The differences between the appointees 
are statistically indistinguishable from one another. To speculate, if only those in the EX pay 
band saw decreased departure rates, it would stand to reason that the institutional arrangement of 
a Senate confirmation be at the heart of the result because it would be harder to confirm the 
replacement. However, several other types of employees that are not subject to confirmation 
hearings display the same decrease in departure, suggesting that senatorial confirmations do not 
shape appointee tenure in different ways. It seems divided government promotes autonomy for 
agencies when presidents and the senate are not of the same party. 12  
 One other somewhat paradoxical result requires additional discussion. The expectation 
for employee tenure as it relates to unemployment rates was that increases in unemployment 
would decrease the probability for exit because there would be fewer alternatives for the next 
job. Yet this result is consistently in the opposite direction. Recent theoretical work by Li (2018) 
provides insight as to why this may occur. In his model, presidents are more likely to retain the 
“bad” type employee in good times. When the times turn bad, presidents are now more likely to 
fire the bad types (and some of the good types) in order to signal to the public responsiveness. 
With unemployment being clearly linked to good and bad times, the empirical result in this paper 
is consistent with the result in the Li (2018) model.  
Anecdotally, there is also reason to speculate that appointees have different career 
prospects than careerists. For example, when Tom Price resigns from his position as the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, his prospect of future employment is quite different 
from a civil servant. As a former member of Congress, should he desire, he could find 
                                                     
12 One might worry that divided government advantages not the appointee, but the president. To evaluate 
this consideration, Appendix N estimates the same models with the career members of the SES and Administrative 
Law Judges. The results suggest that even careerists are more likely to stay in divided government. Therefore, it 
appears that the agency, not the president, is advantaged during times of divided government.  
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employment at a number of different firms that would find his past experience and connections 
valuable. As such, the national unemployment rate for appointees might be tapping in to the 
overall standing of the administration. In other words, bad times economically might lead to the 
removal of appointed officials as scapegoats for a bad economy. Such a decision-making process 
would lead to the observed result and be consistent with good times verse bad times argument in 
Li (2018). 
4.8 Conclusion 
Political appointees operate in a complex environment. When carrying out their job functions, 
they must weigh technical information specific to the policy domain of the agency in addition to 
the political realities that constrain action. Different types of federal employees carry out these 
tasks with varying degrees of statutory authority and protection from political actors. This paper 
provides important evidence that the heterogeneity of officials at the top of the federal hierarchy 
sometimes results in different turnover rates of employees for different forms of oversight. 
The different turnover rates indicate who controls the bureaucracy. When government is 
divided, exits wane. This suggests greater discretion for the agency. Congressional committees 
seem to only reduce autonomy for the SES, which suggests a muted consequence from 
congressional oversight committees on the bureaucracy. Future work should consider if these 
factors trickle down through the hierarchy and alter the length of tenure for career civil servants. 
Demonstrating that politics alters the turnover rates of appointed officials is not 
surprising. They reach public office via the blessing of a political actor; they will always be 
linked to politics. Since the passage of the Pendleton Act, civil service reforms have attempted to 
create a clear demarcation between career officials and appointees. Understanding if, and the 
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extent to which, this occurs shapes the execution of laws in the United States. Future work 
should consider how expedited turnover affects policy outcomes for agencies. 
Chapter 5 
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Conclusion 
As the previous chapters hopefully highlight, federal employees work in a complicated 
work environment. The important work they conduct each day also must deal with political 
factors and realities permeating into their jobs. Chapter 2 demonstrated that federal employees 
contribute individually, not as a collective trying to represent the group. Yet individuals 
contribute more frequently when they are more politically expressive but also in strategic ways 
when those individuals express a greater desire to access policy. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that partisan federal employees from the Bush administration 
were more likely to stay on during the first six years of the Obama administration than 
independents. This finding is interesting because it suggests that employees exiting are not out-
partisans, but rather those caught in the middle of agencies that are becoming more politicized. 
This result is for one cohort and needs additional points in time to assess if this result is true 
across many different administrations. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the context 
surrounding the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration yielded this 
pattern of turnover. Future work should consider if this hollowing out of the middle has persisted 
or if a different paradigm governs other political contexts as it relates to employee exit. 
Chapter 4 provides evidence that agencies gain greater control over their action with 
divided government. Multiple principals provide cover for agencies to enact policies in 
accordance with the preferences of the agencies and not the preferences of the political 
overseers. It is not to say that agencies are being subversive, but rather they are not being 
micromanaged in such a way that would encourage civil servants to exit government. In this 
sense, divided government has the silver lining of encouraging the retention of human capital in 
agencies. 
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Taken collectively, these chapters breathe life in to the notion that federal employees 
possess a heterogeneous set of political beliefs, they act upon those beliefs outside of work, and 
then also have those beliefs interact with their daily work environment. Future work should be 
cognizant of these results and strive to include the differences (some political) between 
individual civil servants rather than assume them to interchangeable or lack preferences of their 
own. 
Several future works naturally extend from this dissertation. From Chapter 2, the design 
created applies to all employees, both federal civil servants and those in the private sector. 
Taking representative samples and merging campaign contribution histories of those employees 
helps better the understanding of who opts to participate in elections through campaign 
contributions. The best way to understand why someone gave is to evaluate that person’s 
decision juxtaposed against a similar person that did not. This is true of both civil servants and 
the population at large. 
Next, the results in Chapter 3 provide evidence that it is not always the out-partisans 
leaving during administration changes or more generally when the president and agency do not 
see eye to eye on a particular policy. Rather, in one case, civil servants across government that 
were partisan were more likely to exit as well as those working in moderate agencies. This 
suggests a politicization of federal employees in a way that may not be congruent with 
democratic norms. Future work should evaluate if this pattern persists both in future 
administrations but also historically to understand how we arrived at this point in time. 
In addition to the substantive work going forward from Chapter 3, a methodological point 
remains to be tested. By examining survey response items with actual departure decisions, 
scholars can examine past conclusions that undergird our understanding of departure to see if the 
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survey “intent to exit” question correctly mapped in to the exit decision of those that took the 
survey. At least with the sample in Chapter 3, it did not. That begs the question of if this 
occurred in other samples or just this set under these conditions. Future work should examine if 
past surveys of public sector employees that generated the expectations about turnover accurately 
reflect who exited government or if there were systemic over or under representations of who left 
from a particular sample. In the case of Chapter 3, it was partisans over representing their exit 
intention. In areas where politics enters less, it may not be the case. Moreover, in places further 
down the hierarchy, civil servants might be more responsive to economic changes or changes in 
the oversight structure that would then change their decision to exit. Future work should consider 
these factors to allow for a better understanding of the exit decision of public sector employees 
more generally. 
Finally, Chapter 4 evaluates agency autonomy by considering when appointees exit 
government. In doing so it excluded people who left their appointed position to enter in to the 
government in some careerist capacity. Becoming a careerist from an appointed position, dubbed 
“burrowing” by the federal government, could compromise merit hiring practices. By excluding 
anyone who burrowed in Chapter 4, I have also identified all instances of burrowing. Who 
burrows? Once in a careerist position, are they staying in government and influencing agency 
decision making or do they become ostracized and leave government more quickly? These are 
important questions to answer if scholars are to understand the consequences of burrowing and if 
presidents use burrowing to continue their influence in agencies well beyond their time in office. 
This line of inquiry, and the others listed, are all research items I plan to take on in the future. 
Federal employees sit in the unenviable position of being tasked with carrying out 
complex policy positions required of the modern administrative state, yet are subject to the 
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intervention of political actors seeking to achieve their own version of what is optimal policy. To 
the extent that the political actors seek to deviate policy from a social optimum set by neutrally 
competent bureaucrats, the ability of those employees to resist political influence in carrying out 
the job function of the agency is paramount to achieving good governance in the modern society. 
Future work should seek to explore this nuanced relationship between the composition of agency 
personnel and how that interacts with the political actors seeking to oversee and influence agency 
behavior. 
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A.  Counts of Candidates Receiving Contributions by Bureaucrats 
Table A1 displays the count of the number of donors for each candidate in the three election 
cycles. Table A2 displays the count of donors that responded to the SFGS in a given year. 
Table A.1: Count of Donors in the SFGS Sample 
by Candidate, 2004-2012 
 
Candidate Name Donors Percent 
2012 Newt Gingrich 1 0.17 
 
Barack Obama 476 91.36 
 
Tim Pawlenty 1 0.17 
 
Mitt Romney 48 8.13 
 
Ron Paul 1 0.17 
 
Total 590 
 2008 Bob Barr 1 0.24 
 
Joe Biden 1 0.24 
 
Sam Brownback 1 0.24 
 
Fred Thompson 5 1.22 
 
Hillary Clinton 18 4.39 
 
Mike Huckabee 1 0.24 
 
John Edwards 1 0.24 
 
John McCain 196 47.8 
 
Barack Obama 157 38.3 
 
Bill Richardson 2 0.49 
 
Mitt Romney 11 2.68 
 
Ron Paul 1 0.24 
 
Rudy Giuliani 12 2.93 
 
Tommy Thompson 3 0.73 
 
Total 410 
 2004 George W. Bush 164 72.56 
 
Howard Dean 3 1.33 
 
John Edwards 2 0.88 
 
Dick Gephardt 1 0.44 
 
Joe Lieberman 1 0.44 
 
John Kerry 55 24.34 
 
Total 226 
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When considering which candidates received money from federal employees, the clear pattern 
that emerges is the eventual nominees receive the lion share of these contributions. By 
considering both the primaries and the general elections together, this outcome should occur. The 
general election has far more contributions (Mitchell, et al. 2015) and those campaigns are 
salient over a much wider timeframe than those eliminated in the primary season. While one 
should not compare absolute numbers received between election years (as sample sizes were not 
the same), in elections with incumbents those candidate receive the vast majority of the 
contributions. This could be a function of placing employees in positions and getting 
contributions in return. Another competing explanation could be donors fearing retribution for 
giving to the losing candidate feel safe to give to an incumbent that likely will win office. One 
stark difference is the sizable proportion of donations given to Barack Obama in 2012. That said 
the sample in the 2014 SFGS that identified as Democratic is much higher than 2008 and the 
appointees are also Democratic rather than Republican. So the proportion of giving from 
Democrats is not particularly outsized given the composition of the sample is heavily 
Democratic. 
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Table A.2: Contributions Made by Survey 
Respondents by Candidate, 2012-2004 
 
Candidate Donor Percent 
2012 Barack Obama 138 92 
 
Mitt Romney 12 8.01 
 
Total 150 
 2008 Bob Barr 1 0.67 
 
Joe Biden 1 0.67 
 
Fred Thompson 2 1.33 
 
Hillary Clinton 8 5.33 
 
Mike Huckabee 1 0.67 
 
John McCain 56 37.33 
 
Barack Obama 71 47.33 
 
Bill Richardson 1 0.67 
 
Mitt Romney 3 2 
 
Rudy Giuliani 6 4 
 
Total 150 
 2004 George W. Bush 50 66.67 
 
Howard Dean 2 2.67 
 
Dick Gephardt 1 1.33 
 
John Kerry 22 29.34 
 
Total 75 
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B. Cross Party Giving 
One potential concern with looking at the decision to give absent partisan direction is that federal 
employees give across party lines with great frequency. If many strong Republicans gave to John 
Kerry in 2004, the results would still find partisanship to be a predictor of giving, yet it would 
not be operating in a way that intuitively makes sense. As such, a check is required to see how 
many times partisans crossed over to the other party when making a campaign contribution. 
 
Table B.1: Cross Party Giving by Federal Employees to Presidential Candidates 
Year 
Repub to 
Dem 
Dem to 
Repub Total 
Percent 
Cross 
Party 
2012 3 1 590 0.68% 
2008 5 2 320 2.50% 
2004 0 0 266 0.00% 
Total 8 3 1176 0.94% 
 
 
As the results in table B clearly show, bureaucrats rarely give across party lines. The behavior is 
true of the population at large, as Dowdle et al. (2013) found little evidence of contributors to 
primary losers giving to the other party in the general election. Importantly for this study, the 
lack of cross party giving justifies the decision to model simply the act of giving.
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C. Multilevel Modeling Robustness Check 
Multilevel modeling is appropriate when groups within the data likely vary along the outcome of 
interest. Canonically, evaluations of students across multiple classrooms need to consider that 
classrooms produce different outcomes for a host of reasons that vary only by classroom. When 
discussing both individuals and agencies in the federal government, this too should be modeled 
with more than one level. Tables C1-C3 display hierarchical models for the models in the body 
of the text.  
 
Table C1: Multilevel Probit Models of Table 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Give 2012 Give 2012 Give 2012 
    
Careerist -1.026*** -0.986*** -1.231*** 
 (-16.77) (-6.30) (-5.51) 
    
ln(Salary) 0.947*** 0.208 0.287 
 (8.86) (0.75) (0.57) 
    
|PID|  0.365** 0.709** 
  (2.66) (2.66) 
    
Values Policy  0.130 0.219* 
  (1.58) (2.12) 
    
Values Move Up  -0.104 -0.100 
  (-1.94) (-1.48) 
    
DC  0.233 0.0378 
  (1.41) (0.19) 
    
Presidential 
Contact 
 -0.0372 -0.103 
  (-0.52) (-1.10) 
    
Committee 
Contact 
 0.126 0.00525 
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  (1.72) (0.05) 
    
|Agency 
Ideology| 
  0.201 
   (1.66) 
    
% Professional   -0.308 
   (-0.83) 
    
ln(Agency Size)   0.0219 
   (0.36) 
    
Committee 
Policy Influence 
  -0.147 
   (-1.50) 
    
White House 
Policy Influence 
  -0.000345 
   (-0.08) 
    
Policy Insulation   -0.275* 
   (-2.43) 
    
Personnel 
Insulation 
  0.259** 
   (2.63) 
    
Rulemaking 
Importance 
  -0.116 
   (-1.37) 
    
Constant -12.31*** -4.476 -5.070 
 (-9.76) (-1.33) (-0.85) 
    
ICC 0.123 4.22e-33 3.69e-34 
 (1.44) (0.37) (0.34) 
N 10138 1080 757 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: Models 1 and 2 estimate robust standard errors as the measures are individualistic. Model 
3 clusters errors by office with the inclusion of group measures. Estimating models with 
clustered standard errors for Models 1 and 2 does not alter the substantive conclusions drawn 
from the estimates. Model 4 estimates agency level models. Model 4 excluded as it was an 
agency average model. 
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Table C2: Multilevel Models of Table 2 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 Give Pres 2008 Give Pres 2008 Give Pres 2004 Give Pres 2004 
     
Careerist -0.689*** 
(0.114) 
-0.582*** 
(0.155) 
-0.655*** 
(0.154) 
-0.507* 
(0.240) 
     
|PID| 0.292** 
(0.104) 
0.249 
(0.138) 
0.612*** 
(0.182) 
0.748** 
(0.260) 
     
|Ideology| 0.0640 
(0.0487) 
0.0675 
(0.0652) 
0.139* 
(0.0700) 
0.0455 
(0.0880) 
     
White House Contact 0.183*** 
(0.0510) 
0.152 
(0.0872) 
0.125** 
(0.0457) 
0.223* 
(0.0876) 
     
Committee Staff Contact -0.0501 
(0.0672) 
0.00337 
(0.0850) 
-0.0545 
(0.0697) 
-0.0181 
(0.104) 
     
% Professional  
 
0.840* 
(0.351) 
 
 
0.229 
(0.384) 
     
ln(Agency Size)  
 
-0.105* 
(0.0432) 
 
 
0.00453 
(0.0406) 
     
|Agency Ideology|  
 
0.00951 
(0.123) 
 
 
-0.106 
(0.128) 
     
Constant -1.840*** 
(0.252) 
-1.343** 
(0.489) 
-2.720*** 
(0.418) 
-3.258*** 
(0.706) 
     
ICC 0.133 
(0.0680) 
0.104 
(0.0682) 
0.00507 
(0.0269) 
0.0180 
(0.0350) 
Observations 1883 1210 1883 1210 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The intraclass correlation is not sufficiently large to justify the need for hierarchical modelling in 
this case. This is due to campaign contributions being rare events so the second level of the 
model lacks variation. Importantly, none of the substantive conclusions reached in the paper 
change when considering these models with multiple levels. 
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D. OPM Computational Alternative Specifications 
Including multiple measures that are percentages with the same denominator makes for 
interpreting changes in one percentage holding all others constant impossible because increasing 
one category must decrease one of the others. As such including measures of different types of 
OPM employment categorization would be doing just this. Therefore, each category was 
estimated independently from one another. Tables D1-D3 estimates each model in the paper with 
different various categories of employees controlled for in the model. The type of employment 
across the categories is not associated with a change in the predicted probability of making a 
campaign contribution.    
Only in 2008 for professional employees are the results statistically significant. Those 
results appear in the body of the text. Because the results are not consistent across specifications 
this result reflects something unique about 2008 or is a false positive. 
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Table D1: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Give Pres 2012 Give Pres 2012 Give Pres 2012 
    
% Technical 0.528   
 (0.94)   
% Clerical  -1.545  
  (-1.14)  
    
% Professional   -0.0901 
   (-0.25) 
    
|PID| 0.718** 0.692** 0.698** 
 (2.97) (2.73) (2.76) 
    
ln(Salary) 0.358 0.248 0.303 
 (0.79) (0.57) (0.66) 
    
Values Policy 0.211 0.208 0.208 
 (1.88) (1.85) (1.84) 
    
Values Move Up -0.117 -0.120 -0.120 
 (-1.63) (-1.67) (-1.68) 
    
|Agency Ideology| 0.108 0.0631 0.0901 
 (0.93) (0.57) (0.79) 
    
ln(Agency Size) -0.0151 -0.00725 -0.00388 
 (-0.28) (-0.15) (-0.08) 
    
Policy Insulation -0.265** -0.268** -0.261** 
 (-2.76) (-2.83) (-2.69) 
    
Personnel Insulation 0.241** 0.211* 0.224** 
 (2.82) (2.50) (2.72) 
    
Constant -6.822 -5.389 -6.113 
 (-1.27) (-1.04) (-1.11) 
N 780 780 780 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
 
 
116 
 
 
 
 Table D2: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 2008  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Give Pres 2008 Give Pres 2008 Give Pres 2008 
% Technical -0.467   
 (-0.90)   
    
% Clerical  0.0958  
  (0.27)  
    
% Professional   0.664* 
   (2.25) 
    
Careerist -0.622*** -0.628*** -0.630*** 
 (-4.93) (-4.86) (-4.87) 
    
|PID| 0.358** 0.356** 0.353** 
 (2.74) (2.75) (2.67) 
    
White House Contact 0.187* 0.187* 0.196* 
 (2.44) (2.45) (2.51) 
    
Committee Staff 
Contact 
-0.0855 -0.0841 -0.0689 
 (-1.10) (-1.08) (-0.89) 
    
ln(Agency Size) -0.120** -0.127*** -0.130*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.44) (-3.39) 
    
Policy Insulation 0.0849 0.0895 0.0572 
 (1.05) (1.12) (0.72) 
    
Personnel Insulation -0.101 -0.0959 -0.0940 
 (-1.12) (-1.06) (-1.03) 
    
Constant -0.692 -0.699 -0.933* 
 (-1.57) (-1.61) (-2.01) 
N 1257 1257 1257 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table D3: Probit Estimates Varying OPM Occupational Classification Control, 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Give Pres 2004 Give Pres 2004 Give Pres 2004 
    
% Technical 0.0305   
 (0.05)   
% Clerical  -0.294  
  (-0.39)  
    
% Professional   0.142 
   (0.35) 
    
Careerist -0.460* -0.451* -0.461* 
 (-2.24) (-2.19) (-2.31) 
    
|PID| 0.792** 0.793** 0.793** 
 (3.12) (3.12) (3.11) 
    
White House Contact 0.145 0.145 0.148 
 (1.63) (1.64) (1.73) 
    
Committee Staff Contact 0.0210 0.0209 0.0225 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
    
ln(Agency Size) 0.0163 0.0163 0.0171 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) 
    
Policy Insulation 0.0535 0.0530 0.0482 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.60) 
    
Personnel Insulation 0.166 0.162 0.165 
 (1.65) (1.64) (1.62) 
    
Constant -3.408*** -3.391*** -3.466*** 
 (-5.71) (-5.76) (-5.26) 
N 1257 1257 1257 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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E. Conditional Values Models 
The relationship between values and the individual could be conditional on partisanship and if 
the individual is an employee or careerist. The idea would be that only those that are ostracized 
by the current administration would feel compelled to contribute to see a seat change in the Oval 
Office. Table E estimate this conditional relationship. Due to the questions only appearing on the 
2012 survey this can only be done for the 2012 estimates.  
From the results in Table E, some evidence of this relationship appears as the sign for the 
interaction is positive for the conditional relationship with partisanship and valuing policy 
influence. The magnitude of the result is quite large and likely stems from a lack of variation due 
to the likelihood of a contribution being a rare event. This leaves over a quarter of the 
observations perfectly determined. As such the results are consistent with theory but sufficiently 
unstable to not warrant inclusion in the body of the text. 
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Table E.1: Conditional Relationship of Values 
 (1) 
 Give Obama  
2012 
Careerist -0.854*** 
 (-4.13) 
  
PID -13.58*** 
 (-15.51) 
  
Values Policy 0.101 
 (0.71) 
  
PID X Values Policy 3.325*** 
 (12.92) 
  
ln(Salary) 0.416 
 (0.83) 
  
Values Move Up -0.149 
 (-1.92) 
  
Agency Ideology -0.159 
 (-1.40) 
  
% Professional -0.0593 
 (-0.13) 
  
ln(Agency Size) 0.00958 
 (0.16) 
  
Policy Insulation -0.186 
 (-1.69) 
  
Personnel Insulation 0.238* 
 (2.05) 
  
Constant -6.113 
 (-1.01) 
N 780 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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F. Agency Average Models 
Evidence of federal employees using campaign contributions to signal administrations would 
require agency characteristics be predictive of contributions from employees. This should 
manifest in models of agency averages predicting the percentage of employees making a 
campaign contribution. Table F show these agency average models where surveys shared 
questions and measures. The results of these estimates show only in 2008 any agency 
characteristic predicting an increase in the share of contributors within that agency. This again 
comports with the diagnostic on multilevel modelling which suggested a lack of second level 
variation. 
Table F.1: Agency Average Models  
 (1) (1) (1) 
 Give Pres 2012 Give Pres 2008 Give Pres 2004 
|Agency Ideology| 0.001 -0.007 0.010 
 (1.68) (-0.81) (1.06) 
    
% Professional -0.004 0.036 -0.052 
 (-0.23) (1.19) (-1.68) 
    
ln(Agency Size) -0.006 -0.014*** -0.009 
 (-1.96) (-3.91) (-1.24) 
    
Policy Insulation 0.0003 0.010 -0.005 
 (0.09) (1.11) (-0.87) 
    
Personnel Insulation 0.004 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.57) (-0.32) (1.08) 
    
Constant 0.081** 0.167*** 0.109 
 (2.72) (5.25) (1.64) 
N 126 134 134 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: The reduced number of agencies stem from the ideology estimates needed five 
respondents to answer. Agencies with fewer than five respondents were not included in 
these estimates. 
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G. Ideology vs PID check 
Another concern with the model specification could be the inclusion of both partisanship and 
ideology in the same model. While the correlation is low enough (ρ <0.33 or less in each sample) 
that multicollinearity should not be a problem, it could be that partisanship simply washes out the 
effect of ideology. If this were to be true, estimating models with just one of the partisanship or 
ideology variables should shed light on to the interplay of these two forms of expressive giving. 
Tables G1-G3 report models from the text, this time excluding one of the partisan or ideological 
variables as well as the models produced in the text. 
What the results consistently show is that partisanship is diminishing the effect of 
ideology. If partisanship is not included, the effect of ideology now increases and is statistically 
distinguishable from zero in all models. That said the marginal change in predicted probability is 
smaller than partisanship in the model with both variables included and partisanship sees a 
similar increase in the magnitude of the change in predicted probability when models exclude 
ideology. Two suggestions naturally follow from this observation. First, ideology and 
partisanship do vary with one another in a positive manner. However, that variation is not that 
large. Even when totally excluding partisanship the marginal change in predicted probability for 
ideology is smaller than partisanship for the model including both variables. Second, excluding 
partisanship, a clearly important variable, creates a model that likely has omitted variable bias. 
Given multicollinearity is likely not an issue here, introducing bias to draw conclusions about 
ideology would be doing so from a model with theoretical issues. As such, the models reported 
in the article contain estimates with both ideology and partisanship in the same model. 
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Table G1: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Give Pres 
2012 
Give Pres 
2012 
Give Pres 
2012 
Give Pres 
2012 
Give Pres 
2012 
Give Pres 
2012 
       
Careerist -.925*** 
(.0943) 
-1.000*** 
(.0928) 
-.926*** 
(.0943) 
-.742*** 
(.225) 
-.834*** 
(.212) 
-.762*** 
(.224) 
       
DC .364** 
(.120) 
.375** 
(.118) 
.366** 
(.120) 
.436* 
(.175) 
.463** 
(.174) 
.452* 
(.176) 
       
|PID| .385*** 
(.0921) 
 
 
.363*** 
(.0939) 
.355*** 
(.102) 
 
 
.313** 
(.105) 
       
|Ideology|  
 
.110* 
(.0515) 
.0381 
(.0542) 
 
 
.169** 
(.0631) 
.0960 
(.0669) 
       
|Agency 
Ideology| 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0313 
0.0870) 
.0130 
(.0840) 
.0283 
(.0871) 
       
Presidential 
Contact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0928 
(.0514) 
.112* 
(.0487) 
.0907 
(.0512) 
       
Appointee 
Contact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0267 
(.0493) 
.0269 
(.0486) 
.0284 
(.0493) 
       
Constant -1.930*** 
(.216) 
-1.335*** 
(.145) 
-1.925*** 
(.219) 
-2.312*** 
(.344) 
-1.834*** 
(.289) 
-2.325*** 
(.344) 
Observations 2915 2997 2863 2289 2352 2248 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table G2: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Give Pres 08 Give Pres 08 Give Pres 08 Give Pres 08 Give Pres 08 Give Pres 08 
       
Careerist -.691*** 
(.0985) 
-.734*** 
(.0969) 
-.685*** 
(.0992) 
-.674*** 
(.109) 
-.734*** 
(.108) 
-.674*** 
(0.111) 
       
Headquarter .611*** 
(.165) 
.646*** 
(.163) 
.616*** 
(.165) 
.510** 
(.177) 
.550** 
(.174) 
.519** 
(.176) 
       
|PID| .367*** 
(.0934) 
 
 
.319*** 
(.0946) 
.311*** 
(.0944) 
 
 
.250** 
(.0956) 
       
|Ideology|  
 
.143** 
(.0450) 
.0780 
(.0462) 
 
 
.154** 
(.0477) 
.100* 
(.0491) 
       
|Clinton-Lewis|  
 
 
 
 
 
-.0910 
(.0684) 
-.103 
(.0677) 
-.0950 
(.0689) 
       
White House 
Contact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0679 
(.0481) 
.0533 
(.0482) 
.0564 
(.0486) 
       
Own Appointee 
Contact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0575 
(.0478) 
.0640 
(.0479) 
.0660 
(.0483) 
       
Constant -2.128*** 
(.254) 
-1.692*** 
(.180) 
-2.143*** 
(.254) 
-2.233*** 
(.301) 
-1.882*** 
(.255) 
-2.261*** 
(.305) 
Observations 1973 2031 1951 1807 1856 1789 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table G3: Ideology and Partisan Multicollinearity Check, 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Give Pres 04 Give Pres 04 Give Pres 04 Give Pres 04 Give Pres 04 Give Pres 04 
       
Careerist -.706*** 
(0.120) 
-.744*** 
(.118) 
-.690*** 
(.122) 
-.727*** 
(.131) 
-.769*** 
(.129) 
-.698*** 
(.132) 
       
Headquarter .186 
(0.177) 
.236 
(.173) 
.179 
(.178) 
.152 
(.192) 
.195 
(.189) 
.139 
(.192) 
       
|PID| .790*** 
(0.191) 
 
 
.700*** 
(.191) 
.738*** 
(.191) 
 
 
.651*** 
(.191) 
       
|Ideology|  
 
.226*** 
(.0558) 
.152** 
(.0590) 
 
 
.213*** 
(.0594) 
.141* 
(.0629) 
       
|Clinton-Lewis|  
 
 
 
 
 
-.0905 
(.0839) 
-.0887 
(.0835) 
-.0745 
(.0846) 
       
White House 
Contact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.0923 
(.0585) 
.104 
(.0563) 
.102 
(.0581) 
       
Own Appointee 
Contact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.0112 
(.0590) 
-.0127 
(.0597) 
-.00930 
(.0595) 
       
Constant -2.893*** 
(.419) 
-1.791*** 
(.203) 
-2.930*** 
(.417) 
-2.795*** 
(.439) 
-1.776*** 
(.287) 
-2.865*** 
(.438) 
Observations 1973 2031 1951 1807 1856 1789 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two-tailed 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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H. What Predicts Changing Opinions? 
 
 Table A1 contains estimates of probit models that predict staying in government for 
career executives stating an intention to exit (0, 1; 50%). The model controls for partisanship, 
salary, gender, being of retirement age, and public service motivation. Two interesting findings 
emerge from this analysis. First, of those “Very likely” to exit, partisans are far more likely to 
say they are going to exit government but not actually leave. This is particularly true of 
Republicans. They are 23% more likely to report an inaccurate exit intention than independents. 
Additionally, it seems those with a higher annual salaries are less likely to stay in government 
despite suggesting they are “Very likely” to exit. These results suggest a potential for systematic 
differences between intent to exit and actual exit even with the limited number of cases.  
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Table H1: Probit Estimations of Staying in Government by 
Response Category to the Likelihood of Leaving Question 
 (1) (2) 
 “Very Likely” “Somewhat Likely” 
Partisan   
Republican 0.766* 
(0.410) 
-0.0997 
(0.413) 
   
Democrat 0.431 
(0.387) 
-0.251 
(0.329) 
Individual   
Retirement Age -0.169 
(0.320) 
0.152 
(0.302) 
   
Female 0.258 
(0.265) 
-0.271 
(0.237) 
   
ln(Salary) -1.808** 
(0.764) 
-3.053*** 
(0.924) 
   
Make a Difference 0.178 
(0.139) 
0.0211 
(0.132) 
   
Salary and Benefits 0.0529 
(0.125) 
-0.0629 
(0.116) 
Contextual   
State Unemployment 0.602*** 
(0.125) 
0.328*** 
(0.0986) 
   
Liberal Agency 0.713** 
(0.297) 
0.182 
(0.257) 
   
Conservative Agency 0.453 
(0.285) 
0.751** 
(0.324) 
   
Constant 16.13* 
(8.978) 
35.49*** 
(11.08) 
N 150 178 
           Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
        * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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I. Chapter 2 Alternative Specification 
 
Table I.1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for 
Turnover of Careerists in the Obama Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Cox Cox Cox 
Partisan    
Republican -0.288** 
(0.132) 
-0.251* 
(0.131) 
-0.251* 
(0.132) 
    
Lean Republican -0.215 
(0.151) 
-0.213 
(0.149) 
-0.219 
(0.149) 
    
Lean Democrat -0.176 
(0.183) 
-0.191 
(0.183) 
-0.223 
(0.184) 
    
Democrat -0.324** 
(0.158) 
-0.312** 
(0.156) 
-0.328** 
(0.156) 
Individual    
Retirement Age  
 
0.405*** 
(0.0946) 
0.408*** 
(0.0945) 
    
Female  
 
-0.0904 
(0.0958) 
-0.0958 
(0.0960) 
    
ln(Salary)  
 
0.473* 
(0.272) 
0.530* 
(0.275) 
    
Make a Difference  
 
-0.0868** 
(0.0438) 
-0.0846* 
(0.0438) 
    
Salary and Benefits  
 
0.0882** 
(0.0443) 
0.0862* 
(0.0446) 
Contextual    
State Unemployment  
 
 
 
0.0182 
(0.0344) 
    
Liberal Agency  
 
 
 
-0.171* 
(0.102) 
    
Conservative Agency  
 
 
 
-0.193* 
(0.101) 
Cases 
Observations 
Failures 
6612 
1024 
533 
6612 
1024 
533 
6612 
1024 
533 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individuals.  
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01    
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J. Models Estimating Conditional Relationships 
 One assumption within the estimation in Table 2 is that there are no conditional 
relationships between individual partisanship and the ideology of the agency. Yet Bolton et al. 
(2016) found that agencies with ideological disagreements with the president have higher 
turnover. To test this conditional consideration, models similar to the one in Table 2, this time 
with interaction terms for the partisanship of the individual and the ideological leaning of the 
agency, are included. The previous substantive findings are consistent with the inclusion of 
interaction terms and no robust conditional relationship appears. There is suggestive evidence 
that Republicans in conservative agencies might leave more than other Republicans, but the 
Wald test between the two coefficients is inconclusive (p = .1). When the data are subset by 
agency type, partisans that stay the most are in moderate agencies. In liberal agencies both 
Republicans and Democrats are negatively signed but not precisely estimated. In conservative 
agencies, the magnitude of the effect is even smaller than liberal agencies. Perhaps this suggests 
partisanship does not matter for conservative agencies, but additional years and other 
administrations need consideration before making such a claim. 
Cameron et al. (2015) suggest another conditional relationship between partisanship and 
age. If individuals truly wait out administrations they are in ideological disagreement with, then 
Democrats past retirement age should be more likely to stay than Republicans to receive their 
payoffs from staying in government. To test this consideration, the indicator for being of the 
retirement age is interacted with partisanship using the same controls as the model that produced 
Table 2. Table J2 displays the results suggesting no conditional relationship between age, 
partisanship and exit. Republicans and Democrats of retirement age exit at rates similar to one 
another. This suggests that the longer time horizons that might incentivize those in the out-party 
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to stay do not outweigh the decision to leave government (and presumably retire).  
A final concern might be that the first two years in the period considered take place 
during the Bush administration. Estimates in Table J3 replicate specifications from Table 2 
excluding those years. The relationships are less precisely estimated due to losing two periods, 
but results in Table 2 persist. Partisanship is still negatively signed for both Republicans and 
Democrats and of similar magnitudes. Moreover, the individual and contextual explanations that 
were statistically significant in Table 2 are statistically significant and signed in the same 
direction for Table J3. 
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Table J1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Turnover of Careerists in the Obama 
Administration with Interaction Terms for Agency Ideology and Individual Partisanship 
 (1) 
 Cox 
Partisan 
Republican 
 
-0.528*** 
(0.201) 
  
Democrat -0.385** 
(0.184) 
  
Conservative Agency -0.538** 
(0.250) 
  
Liberal Agency -0.371 
(0.269) 
  
Republican X Conservative Agency 0.516* 
(0.313) 
  
Republican X Liberal Agency 0.370 
(0.355) 
  
Democrat  X Conservative Agency 0.347 
(0.281) 
  
Democrat X Liberal Agency 0.195 
(0.296) 
Individual  
Retirement Age 0.401*** 
(0.0945) 
  
Female -0.1000 
(0.0953) 
  
ln(Salary) 0.530* 
(0.276) 
  
Make a Difference -0.0860** 
(0.0430) 
  
Salary and Benefits 0.0801* 
(0.0439) 
Contextual  
State Unemployment 0.0199 
(0.0346) 
  
Cases 
Observations 
Failures 
6717 
1040 
543 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table J.2: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of Exit Exploring 
Retirement Age as a Conditional Relationship with Partisanship 
 (1) 
 Cox 
Partisan 
Republican 
 
-0.247 
(0.155) 
  
Democrat -0.180 
(0.139) 
  
Retirement Age 0.513** 
(0.233) 
  
Republican X Retirement Age -0.0791 
(0.312) 
  
Democrat X Retirement Age -0.154 
(0.257) 
Individual  
Female -0.0988 
(0.0946) 
  
ln(Salary) 0.550** 
(0.273) 
  
Make a Difference -0.0893** 
(0.0426) 
  
Salary and Benefits 0.0875** 
(0.0436) 
Contextual  
State Unemployment 0.0194 
(0.0340) 
  
Liberal Agency -0.167* 
(0.0999) 
  
Conservative Agency -0.201** 
(0.100) 
Cases 
Observations 
Failures 
6717 
1040 
543 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individual. 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01    
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Table J.3: Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Exit Using only Obama Administration 
Years, 2009 - 2015 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Partisan 
Republican 
 
-0.244* 
(0.143) 
 
-0.237* 
(0.142) 
 
-0.249* 
(0.142) 
    
Democrat -0.258** 
(0.125) 
-0.224* 
(0.125) 
-0.220* 
(0.125) 
Individual    
Retirement Age  
 
0.382*** 
(0.0979) 
0.384*** 
(0.0983) 
    
Female   
 
-0.0770 
(0.0988) 
-0.0823 
(0.0991) 
    
Ln(salary)   
 
0.410 
(0.286) 
0.446 
(0.289) 
    
Make a Difference  
 
-0.0890** 
(0.0454) 
-0.0891** 
(0.0454) 
    
Salary and Benefits  
 
0.0898* 
(0.0459) 
0.0886* 
(0.0461) 
Contextual    
State Unemployment  
 
 
 
0.0329 
(0.0358) 
    
Liberal Agency  
 
 
 
-0.120 
(0.105) 
    
Conservative Agency  
 
 
 
-0.160 
(0.104) 
Cases 
Observations 
Failures 
4692 
987 
491 
4692 
987 
491 
4692 
987 
491 
  Standard errors in parentheses, clustered to individuals  
  * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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K.  Discussion of Controls 
 Several other estimates from Table 2 help in understanding exit. Federal executives with 
higher salaries are more likely to exit. An increase in pay of one standard deviation of salary 
results in an increased exit rate of 12.1% in any period. Under the pay plans used by the federal 
government, those with higher pay have greater skills and responsibilities, thus making them the 
most likely targets for the private sector. A competing explanation for the correlation between 
pay and departure is that those at the top of the pay scale face pay ceilings that could increase the 
gap between public and private sector pay, leading to increased departure rates. The question 
then becomes if the people with stagnant pay at the top of the pay scale exit because of the pay 
ceiling or because they have the greatest private sector marketability. Future work with a larger 
sample should consider this dynamic over time so the proper prescription to retaining top civil 
servants can be applied. 
 Beyond compensation, measuring why someone entered government helps in 
understanding that individual’s propensity to exit. Individuals that entered government to make a 
difference are more likely to stay in government while those that entered for pay and benefits are 
more likely to exit. The result suggests those that report a more altruistic motivation for service 
stay and continue their work while those motivated by pay and benefits are less likely to stay in 
government. Moving one response category up the scale, which is close to a one standard 
deviation increase, increases hazards of exit by 10 percent for those valuing salary and decreases 
hazards of exit by 10 percent for those wanting to make a difference.56 Importantly, the 
differentiation of employees by their public service motivation helps in understanding which 
employees are more likely to stay in government. This also highlights a key difference between 
                                                     
56 Recall, Pay and Benefits s.d. .988; Make a Difference s.d. .919. 
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public sector employees and those in the private sector. Civil servants that feel a commitment to 
the mission of the agency and want to serve the country are more likely to stay in government.57 
 Finally, three demographic controls require brief discussion. First, when career civil 
servants reach retirement age, they are much more likely to exit. A civil servant who is 65 years 
old or older is 7.0 percent more likely to exit in each given period. Retirement motivates exit just 
like any other citizen, even for top career civil servants. Additionally, we cannot reject the null 
that gender has no influence on departure propensities for this group. Women that ascend to the 
tops of the civil servant ranks are no more or less likely to exit government than their male 
counterparts. Lastly, unemployment rates for the state in which the career civil servant works is 
not associated with that individual’s decision to exit government. In the period considered, which 
included the Great Recession, top civil servants’ exit decisions were not associated with outside 
unemployment levels in the state they worked in.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
57 One might believe conditional relationships between the public service motivation questions and what 
the individuals are actually being paid. Interactions between these questions and salary reveal no such relationship. 
The hazards are indistinguishable from the baseline hazard for the interaction term. 
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L. Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics 
While all employees considered are at the top of the federal hierarchy, not all departing their 
current position exit government. For appointees moving to career positions this is referred to as 
“burrowing”. This practice has garnered attention from Congress and the GAO at different 
periods in time. To give an idea of just how often this is occurring, Table A1 reports the number 
of people who left a top pay band and moved to some other pay band in the federal government. 
In addition, Table A1 reports how many person-quarters are lost due to these individuals that did 
not exit government for the estimates in Table 2. All quarters for individuals who ultimately 
“burrowed” are excluded. 
 
Table L1: Descriptive Statistics of Individuals Leaving of Pay Plan but Remaining in the 
Federal Government 
 
EX Pay Schedule C 
Noncareer 
SES 
Number of People 
Burrowing 
968 4,074 2,084 
 
  
 
Quarters of 
Employees who 
Burrow 
21,540 35,732 29,511 
    
Quarters of 
Employees who Exit 
Government  
29,003 89,910 34,986 
 
 
 
136 
 
 
M. Summary of Chapter 3 Control Variables 
Table M.1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
 
EX 
Schedule 
C Noncareer SES 
Age 49.4 35.3 42.97 
 
(9.81) (11.6) (9.68) 
Pay (2016 Dollars) $176,026 $101,300 $167,249 
 
($17,140) ($37,615) ($17,318) 
Quarterly 
Unemployment 6.37 6.15 6.34 
 
(1.58) (1.59) (1.63) 
Independent Agency 0.40 0.20 0.22 
 
(0.49) (0.40) (0.41) 
Conservative Agency 0.42 0.39 0.44 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) 
Liberal Agency 0.25 0.31 0.26 
 
(0.44) (0.46) (0.44) 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.  
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N. Comparison to Career Civil Servants 
Career members of the Senior Executive Service are the top career civil servant in the 
federal government, possessing excellent skills in management. The professionalism for these 
employees makes them interchangeable, allowing agencies (and by extension the president) to 
reassign career members of the SES with very little advance warning or legal restrictions.58 
While they are technically protected from political firings, the ease with which reassignments 
can occur still could subject these employees to presidential influence should the administration 
wish to target particular employees.59 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are the final type of civil servant considered. These 
federal employees represent a highly professional class of civil servant that are particularly 
insulated from political actors. As stipulated by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ALJs 
go through a rigorous screening mechanism and are the only federal judges to reach their 
position through solely merit. ALJs, under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §557, are 
not allowed to be policy or rule makers. While part of the executive branch, ALJs receive no 
direction or supervision from any employee in the federal agency and are exempt from 
performance ratings, valuations, and bonuses. Removal requires a petition be filed with the Merit 
Systems Protection Board and good-faith errors are not grounds for dismissal (Butz v. 
                                                     
58 An agency may reassign a career SES member to any SES position in the agency for which he/she is qualified. 
Reassignments in the Same Commuting Area require a 15-day advance written notice, which may be waived only 
when the appointee consents in writing. Reassignments to a Different Commuting Area require consultation with the 
executive and a 60-day advance written notice, which may be waived only when the appointee consents in writing. 
An agency may remove a career appointee who fails to accept a directed reassignment under adverse action 
procedures. The appointee is entitled to appeal the removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. A career 
appointee may be transferred to another agency to an SES position for which he/she is qualified, with the consent of 
the appointee and the gaining agency. 
59 Anne Gorsuch notably used target reassignments in the EPA (Golden 2001). At least one member of the 
Career SES felt the Trump administration used this on him and 50 other in the Department of the Interior (Clement 
2017). 
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Economou, 1978). As such, ALJs occupy important positions within agencies, yet enjoy great 
protection from dismissal. Because ALJs leave government on their own terms with next to no 
involvement from political actors, they provide a useful placebo to compare to other employees. 
The following Tables and Figures take the same approach as the body of the paper. 
Models estimated on career civil servants are identical to the ones appearing in the main text. 
From these results, it is clear that career civil servants exit less frequently than appointees and 
the factors associated with those changes do not have the same magnitudes. Career members of 
the SES exit like Noncareer SES as it relates to the number of oversight committees and an 
opposition Senate. Yet, unlike appointees, career members of the SES are less likely to exit when 
the economy worsens. 
 
Table N1: Length of Tenure Description, 1977-2014 
 EX Pay Schedule C Noncareer 
SES 
Career SES Administrative 
Law Judges 
Number of 
employees 
 
4,278 14,673 7,024 34,022 3,265 
Number of 
quarter-persons 
 
61,129 151,620 77,123 865,860 13,5761 
Number of exits 
 
3,893 13,453 6,430 27,446 1,542 
Median length of 
tenure 
 
11 
Quarters 
8   Quarters 9     
Quarters 
17 Quarters 34             
Quarters 
Mean length of 
tenure 
 
13.1 
Quarters 
9.7 Quarters 10.3 
Quarters 
24.7 
Quarters 
40.6          
Quarters 
Year First 
Observed  
1977 1982 1979 1979 1991 
Longest Tenure 
88 
Quarters 
97 Quarters 88  
Quarters 
140 Quarters 94             
Quarters 
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Table N.2: Estimates for Government Exit for Federal Employees, 1977-2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 EX Pay Schedule C Noncareer 
SES 
Career SES ALJs 
Number of 
Committees 
 
0.0051 
(0.0039) 
-0.0024 
(0.0019) 
0.0079** 
(0.0027) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0213 
(0.014) 
Opposition Senate -0.078* 
(0.0394) 
 
-0.081*** 
(0.022) 
-0.107** 
(0.036) 
-0.058*** 
(0.011) 
0.0530 
(0.054) 
Presidential Approval 0.0045*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0056*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
      
Independent Agency -0.259*** 
(0.024) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
-0.055*** 
(0.008) 
-0.077 
(0.044) 
      
Liberal Agency 0.071* 
(0.028) 
0.084*** 
(0.016) 
0.066** 
(0.023) 
-0.061*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031 
(0.044) 
      
Conservative Agency 0.080** 
(0.025) 
0.0627*** 
(0.016) 
0.075*** 
(0.021) 
0.037*** 
(0.0082) 
0.0396 
(0.087) 
      
Unemployment 0.157*** 
(0.013) 
0.185*** 
(0.008) 
0.204*** 
(0.012) 
-0.019*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.022 
(0.026) 
      
Administration FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Term-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Duration Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individuals Traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 41,257 108,034 55,689 717,160 116,308 
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Note: Point estimates generated by calculating marginal change in the probability of exit then 
multiplying the marginal change by 8 to note differences across a two-year period. For 
continuous measures, the estimate was also multiplied by a one standard deviation change to 
provide a more plausible change in the probability of exit. 
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Administrative Law Judges thus far have received very little attention. That stems from 
very little in the model explaining their exit from the federal government. At face value, ALJs 
appear similar to top federal employees. They are well compensated and educated. Yet they 
reach their positions through a rigorous screening based on merit and have nearly no oversight 
from elected officials and careerists within the agency. The null results provide a useful placebo 
test to suggest the results for appointed officials and Career SES are not simply the function of 
trends within federal employment that spuriously correlate with political explanations for exit. 
ALJs turnover at a much slower rate descriptively than even career members of the SES and 
political factors seem orthogonal to their decision to exit. These results suggest two conclusions. 
First, the insulation and selection mechanism seem to be sheltering ALJs from politics as it 
relates to their decision to remain in government. Second, observed political exit for other types 
of federal employees is not simply a function of general personnel trends within the executive 
branch. 
 
 
